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EFFECTIVE TIME MANAGEMENT IN
BATTALION TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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by

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B.S., USMA, West Point, New York, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

EFFECTIVE TIME MANAGEMENT IN TASK FORCE OPERATIONS by
MAJ Daniel J. Klecker, USA, 130 pages.

This thesis examines whether or not the management of time is a problem within battalion task force tactical operations.

Analysis of data collected at the National Training Center is used to isolate areas that are symptomatic of time management deficiencies and to establish that a problem of managing time exists within task force operations.

This study establishes that time management is a problem within task force operations and that current doctrinal references offer incomplete time management guidance. This study then suggests a variety of techniques and procedures to improve the problem.

This study concludes time can be better managed within task force tactical operations. Comments generated by observer controllers, ideas presented in contemporary literature and the experiences of the author are melded together to present a philosophy to illustrate how to better manage time.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A project as time consuming and involved as this thesis represents the efforts of several people. I would like to take this opportunity to try to give to them some of the credit they deserve.

I have been blessed with a rich Army career that has afforded me the opportunity to work with many fine soldiers, officers and enlisted alike. Most of the concepts and ideas listed in this document represent the teachings of these fine soldiers. I merely tried to capture them as best I could.

The groundwork for this project began over three years ago in the mud of Hohenfels at the CMTC, with observer controllers recognizing problems and discussing possible solutions to help training units improve their combat skills.

I thank my committee members, who remained enthusiastic and helpful throughout the entire process, always seeking opportunities to provide assistance and ideas.

Finally, I continue to remain eternally indebted to Donna, my wife, who always supports my endeavors to the fullest. As usual, she is always there for our children and me, keeping us going when the going gets a little rough. She is always the best wife, the greatest mom, and this year, the soccer coach.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CP	command post
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center
CTC	combat training center
CTCP	combat trains command post
FRAGO	fragmentary order
HQ	headquarters
LD	line of departure
NTC	National Training Center (Fort Irwin, CA)
OC	observer controller
OPORD	operations order
PCC	precombat checks
PCI	precombat inspections
SOP	standard operating procedure
TAA	tactical assembly area
TF	Task Force (Battalion sized, in this study)
TLP	troop leading procedures
TOC	tactical operations center
TTP	tactics, techniques and procedures
WARNORD	warning order

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Go, sir, gallop, and don't forget that the world was made in six days. You can ask me for anything you like, except time.¹

Napoleon Bonaparte

"Historically units in combat and training have two enemies, the Threat and time."² Time is one of the most valuable resources of leaders at all levels. It is a finite and nonrenewable resource. Once it is used, it is gone forever.

Experience at the Combat Training Centers indicates that training units usually know what to do, but often experience difficulty accomplishing all the tasks required in the conduct of operations. Effective time management may be a contributing factor to the overall success or failure of a unit in any given mission. Because of their unique and often intangible qualities, the contributing factors of effective time management are often difficult to isolate and quantify.

The Problem

The purpose of this research is to determine whether or not time management is a problem within battalion task force operations. If it can be shown that time management is a problem, then this research will attempt to establish why. To achieve this aim, subordinate issues must be addressed.

The Subproblems

1. What activities are symptomatic of time management deficiencies within task force operations?
2. Does sufficient guidance exist in the Army to facilitate effective time management within task force operations?
3. Are there techniques and procedures available to improve time management in task force operations?

The Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will assist in locating the data and aid in resolving the research problem:

1. Ineffective time management impairs activities within the task force.
2. The doctrinal guidance available to leaders and units is incomplete and does not facilitate implementation of effective time management within the task force.

The Assumptions

A few assumptions have been made for this study.

1. U.S. Army doctrine for mechanized and armor task forces will not change significantly in the near future.
2. Units training at the National Training Center (NTC) are representative of the combat units in the Army.
3. The size and randomness of the research sample will be representative of the combat units in the Army

The Definition of Terms

In this study, all terminology will be used in the context of current doctrinal application. One term requiring operationalization is time management. Time management is defined as the use of all time available to a leader. For the purpose of this study, time available begins with receipt of the warning order from higher headquarters and ends with the time the mission is scheduled to begin.

The parameters for examining the effective management of this available time by a leader will be adherence to principles and completion of critical tasks. These principles will be presented in chapter two and discussed in chapter three. The critical tasks will be presented and discussed in chapter three. Any additional terms requiring definition are found in the glossary at Appendix A.

The Limitations

There are three limitations identified in this study. Limitations are restrictions which are beyond the control of the researcher. They are identified to help others to understand why these restrictions exist.

1. There have not been any "focused" rotations conducted at the NTC to address the issues associated specifically with time management. A "focused" rotation is a training rotation which, in addition to all of the usual feedback and observations collected and analyzed by the observer controller team, specifically seeks information directed at a focused area of interest. Time management has not been a variable which has been specifically measured or analyzed. Therefore, information or findings may not be readily available and capsulized within the NTC take home package materials. Consequently, careful judgement may have to be rendered occasionally in determining linkage between a poorly performed task and the likelihood that ineffective time management was a contributing factor.

2. Secondary sources will be used to supplement the discussion of time management issues. These sources are presented in the literature review and bibliography.

3. By design, authorities have not released specific data regarding the objective success or failure of the studied units with respect to mission accomplishment. Thus a dependent variable that would afford inferential

statistical analysis is lacking. Consequently, analysis must be confined to description.

The Delimitations

To permit proper focus, a few delimitations are appropriate for this study. Delimitations are restrictions imposed by the researcher to make the research feasible within time or other constraints.

1. The research will be limited to take home packages from the NTC. (A take home package is collection of facts, observations, analysis and comments by the observer controller team provided to a training unit for their reference concerning their training rotation.)

2. The units will be randomly selected without regard for their home station location, level of training proficiency or any other factors. The identity of these units will remain anonymous.

3. This study will only examine time management issues within task force operations.

The Need for the Study

The value of this study lies in its relevance. Specifically, this study will attempt to determine if time management is a problem within task force operations. If it is determined to be a problem, this study will attempt to determine why. Then, specific techniques and procedures

will be presented to assist in better time management within task force operations. These techniques and procedures could be of benefit to every battalion in the Army.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Time is the essence in war, and while a defeat may be balanced by a battle won, days and hours--even minutes--frittered away, can never be regained.

Brigadier General S. B. Griffith, II
USMC: The Battle for Guadalcanal, ii
1963

The purpose of this literature review is to determine the current state of information available on the subject of time management. It will be conducted in three distinct phases. First, the current state of literature on the general subject of time management will be examined. Next, an analysis of current military doctrinal publications will be conducted to determine what specific time management information is available. Finally, a review of contemporary military literature will be conducted to determine what feedback and information is emanating from the military community pertaining to the subject matter.

Books

There have been numerous books published on the subject of time management. Furthermore, effective time

management is a recurring theme in the numerous works published under the general category of stress. An overwhelming volume of information pertaining to time management is catalogued under the heading of "stress". Over one-hundred thousand articles and books, one-thousand research projects and six-thousand new publications emerge each year.² For practical reasons, not every published source could be obtained for review. However, a representative sample of the current literature was examined and a general synopsis is presented. Where a specific work provides dominating views, the author is appropriately identified.

"Time is money."³ This is the most frequent theme that emerges from the review of the general subject of time management. Corporations and businesses directly translate loss of time to loss of money. In regard to the issue of time management, more efficient use of time is directly related to increased profits for the business. The business community displays a constant sensitivity to effective time management.

Kenneth Blanchard, Ph.D., is a recognized leader in the field of management. He has authored several books, most notably the One Minute Manager series. In his book, The One Minute Manager Meets the Monkey (1989), he details several time management principles. These principles include properly training subordinates, fixing

responsibility, prioritizing work, and appropriate managerial supervision and delegation. For the most part, these principles are very straight-forward in their meaning and application.

Since it may have value to this study, Blanchard's presentation of the principle of delegation warrants further discussion. He makes an important distinction between the terms "assign" and "delegate."⁴ Assigning a task merely fixes a subordinate with accomplishing a specific requirement. Delegation has much broader implications. Proper delegation fixes the well-trained subordinate with a mission, a family of tasks. The supervisor provides the subordinate with sufficient guidance and resources and allows him to execute the mission using his initiative. The subordinate gains ownership of the mission, and as such, will usually perform at a much higher level. The supervisor is thereby liberated from the meticulous details of the project and able to invest his time in other areas.

In a subsequent book in this series, The One Minute Manager Builds High Performing Teams (1990), Blanchard discusses the process for building high performing teams. This team building discussion has applicability to the team building of staffs and headquarters elements in the Army. Delegation is a key theme throughout this book. The most important function of the leader is to assist the group in moving through the stages of group development by proper

application of the appropriate leadership style (directing, coaching, supporting, and delegating). The goal is for the leader to be able to effectively delegate responsibilities and missions. The result is a much more cohesive and efficient staff, able to produce at a higher level with less direct supervision. To the leader of the group, the result is less time consumed in directing the minute aspects of the operation and greater time available to attend to other matters.

Jeffery J. Mayer's book, If You Haven't Got The Time to do it Right, When Will You Find the Time to do it Over? (1990), is entirely devoted to efficient daily office practices designed to save time for executives. He proposes several principles to that end. These include making lists of tasks, and prioritizing them, establishing a schedule and adhering to it, and an entire chapter on the art of delegation. A key technique he provides is to ensure the subordinate has a clear picture of any delegated work and knows what kind of results are expected.⁵ This same technique has importance in the Army. It is referred to as the commander's intent.

The Effective Executive (1966), by Peter F. Drucker, analyzes the practices that executives must master in order to be truly effective. Chapter two addresses time management. Drucker asserts that "effective executives know that time is the limiting factor."⁶ As such, he proposes

that effective executives start with time available, then concentrate upon the tasks required to be performed. He advocates many of the principles discussed earlier, most notably, prioritizing tasks, establishing a time line and delegation.

Similar focus on time is expressed in Walter H. Gmelch's Beyond Stress to Effective Management (1982). Gmelch postulates that "effective executives start with their time, not their tasks."⁷ He goes on to address this issue by discussing prioritizing and scheduling. His discussion of time management is in the context of an individual having too much to accomplish in the time available, and the resulting stress this creates.

The most significant recurring theme from these works is the presentation and discussion of general principles for effective time management. The principles that repeatedly emerge include:

1. Properly train staff and subordinates
2. Delegate to the lowest possible level
3. Provide a clear picture of purpose
4. Fix responsibility
5. Be proactive, anticipate
6. Supervise/inspect
7. Prioritize work
8. Establish suspenses, and adhere to them

The applicability of each of these publications is not limited to the civilian sector. Each of the principles listed above is addressed in Army doctrinal publications. Additional references which offer further discussion of these principles are presented in the bibliography.

Military Doctrinal Publications

The focus of this portion of the literature review is to identify the specific time management information available in current doctrinal publications. The issue of time management appears frequently in U.S. Army doctrinal publications. However, the discussion is usually not greatly detailed and is characterized by providing guidance on "what" should be done. Generally, information on "how" it should be done seems to be absent or very limited.

FM 100-5, Operations, is the U.S. Army's keystone warfighting manual. Much of the time management discussion in this document focuses on aspects required to achieve battlefield synchronization. One might not expect the issue of time management would receive much attention in such a concise but complex document. However, the issue of time management emerges frequently in this manual. It first appears in the discussion of command and control found in Chapter 2.

A command and control system which seeks to promote flexibility and freedom to operate independently must emphasize certain command practices and specific operational techniques. "First, it must optimize the use of time...." The discussion continues by presenting techniques such as routine use of warning orders, situation updates and anticipatory positioning of forces and planning.⁸

The issue of time management is addressed again during the "time" component of METT-T analysis. During the discussion of planning, preparing and conducting attacks in chapter 7, the authors present Clausewitz's warning that "time not used by the attacker benefits the defender."⁹ This statement is tempered by a discussion of General Patton's careful distinction between haste and speed. General Patton, who stressed the efficient use of time in all of his operations, advocated judicious investment of time to properly prepare for an attack. Once the attack was underway, it was executed with great speed, contributing to successful mission accomplishment with fewer casualties.¹⁰

Chapter 9 presents a discussion on planning and preparing for defense. "The amount of time to prepare is a crucial factor in organizing a defense." The authors discuss tasks commanders must accomplish and the importance that tasks be completed. There is a general lack of specificity in addressing how the time is to be managed, only "time is a critical element for the defender and cannot be wasted." Although no discussion is presented on how to manage the time available, certain techniques are provided for consideration if a lack of time exists. Suggestions include maintaining a larger reserve or accepting greater risk.¹¹

FM 100-5 devotes little other attention specifically to the topic of time management, although this issue appears

routinely in the discussion of other matters. War gaming, rehearsals and realistic training prepare units and leaders for cooperation in the chaos of combat without time-consuming coordination.¹² Additionally, the importance of unit SOP's, delegation of authority, and anticipation occurs in the AirLand Battle Imperatives discussion. The importance of commander's intent is stressed throughout this document.

"Time is the critical factor in all operations."¹³
FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force describes the doctrinal and tactical employment of the tank and mechanized infantry battalion task force on the AirLand Battlefield. This document reflects and supports the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine as presented in FM 100-5. As such, many of the same principles are presented, only focused at the battalion task force level, and usually with greater detail.

References to time management appear throughout FM 71-2. The most substantial discussion is provided in chapter 2, Command and Control. The first item listed in the discussion of the key command and control considerations for the task force commander is "making maximum use of time."¹⁴ The tools to assist the commander in accomplishing this are detailed and practiced SOP's, efficient execution of the troop leading procedures and an appropriately applied decision-making process. The development of an informal

schedule, a time line, is addressed. Additionally, commander's intent, anticipating requirements and prioritizing work are discussed.

Appendix B of FM 71-2, Combat Orders, presents some practical time saving techniques. It discusses the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, use of warning orders, and use of a matrix operations order format to reduce orders preparation time, thus allowing more time for subordinates.

"Time is the critical factor affecting planning and execution."¹⁵ FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, describes how the tank and infantry company team fights on the AirLand battlefield. Understandably, this document directly supports the information presented in FM 71-2. As such, the information discussed closely resembles the discussion presented in the review of FM 71-2. The topics of SOP's, training of subordinates, delegation of authority, use of troop leading procedures and briefbacks are discussed as they pertain to effective time management.

Two additional areas are discussed. The use of multiple warning orders was presented as a useful technique to keep subordinates informed as early as possible as additional information becomes available. Also, development of a time line using the reverse planning technique was detailed and an example was provided.

FM 25-100, Training the Force establishes the Army's training doctrine, applicable throughout the force. The

focus of this document is to provide necessary guidelines on how to plan, execute and assess training at all levels. Time management discussion is oriented towards the effective management of training time to that of training "time management". This document emphasizes the conduct of tough realistic training that prepares units and soldiers for the rigors of the battlefield.

FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, is the training document directed at the leaders at battalion level and below to guide them in the development and execution of training programs. As the title suggests, this document emphasizes battle focused training. One might argue that training under conditions that attempt to replicate the harsh conditions of combat should include realistic time constraints, but this is not stated specifically in this document.

FM 25-101 mentions repeatedly to train in a wartime environment and to maintain a battle focus. How to do this is left up to the initiative of the unit leadership. The issue of realistically-timed scenarios is only mentioned briefly, however, in the context of replicating a continuous, 24-hour wartime environment. One might infer this to mean training time management, but it is not specifically stated. As in FM 25-100, the mention of time management is in the context of development of a system to protect training time. There is discussion of knowing and

using a unit SOP, prioritizing work, and practicing battle drills to enhance executing key actions quickly.

The publications reviewed above represent the doctrinal guidance provided to training units and soldiers within mechanized infantry and armor battalion task forces. Generally, there is frequent mention of the issue of time management, although it is never really a focused discussion. The discussion is usually a part of another topic and is characterized by providing guidance on "what" should be done. Generally, information on "how" to manage time effectively seems to be limited.

Military Periodicals and Other Sources

The final portion of this literature review is designed to determine what information concerning time management is being written about within the military community. Military periodicals will be the primary focus, but this portion of the review will also include bulletins published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and other publications from the Combined Arms Research Library.

"Effective Company Defense--A Matter of Task and Time Management" was published recently in Infantry Magazine. The authors recognized a problem with company-sized training units exercising effective time management while conducting defensive operations at the National Training Center (NTC). They propose a three-phased approach

to this problem. Although very systematic, innovative, and detailed, their solution is limited in that it addresses only the issue of company operations and only during defensive missions.

"Time and Timing: Both Critical in Combat" is an article that appeared in Army Magazine, written by Major General A.S. Newman. This article details a first-hand account of how a regimental commander anticipated that a decision was required immediately, and made this decision while eliminating the normal planning process for his subordinate commanders during combat operations in the Philippines. This article illustrates the exception rather than the rule. That is, the regimental commander had the resolve to act decisively in a time-sensitive situation rather than exercise the normal planning procedures. However, this article does emphasize the importance of recognizing when normal planning procedures may have to be streamlined or omitted during a crisis situation.

E.M. Flanagan, Jr., authored an article entitled "Before the Battle". This article, which was published in Army Magazine, discussed some of the principles of effective time management which should be considered by commanders. Among them include making a list of tasks and prioritizing them. Additionally, he addressed activities to become more organized and efficient at the personal level.

"Time Management Techniques for Supervisors" is an article authored by Richard F. Gordon and published in Logistics Spectrum. Gordon argues that time management is one of the most important skills a supervisor can develop. First, he suggests planning activities, and maintaining an agenda. In doing this, priorities need to be assigned. Then, delegate to subordinates the tasks they are capable of doing. He advocates increasing the level of training of subordinates so they are capable of accomplishing more difficult tasks. He believes that delegation is an important ingredient of good management and carries with it the responsibility of ensuring the subordinates have the requisite skills and knowledge to accomplish delegated tasks. He also advocates not being a perfectionist, rather, accepting realistic quality in your own efforts and from subordinates.

A Marine Corps officer, CAPT Kenneth F. McKenzie authored "Maneuvering in Time", an article published in the Marine Corps Gazette. This article stresses the importance of the element of time. McKenzie skillfully uses battle analysis to provide keen historical perspective and insight to the time management issue. He asserts proper use of time conjures opportunity, which can create an assailable flank in and of itself. Additionally, he suggests initiative is a product of the superior use of time, combined with good, rapid decision-making.

Included in McKenzie's article is the discussion of several ideas that might help make units and commanders more efficient consumers of time. Among these are the use of SOP's and battle drills, training under realistic time constraints without the benefit of known "canned scenarios", and the study of history to learn from the lessons of the past.

Additionally, McKenzie presents the discussion of "better is the enemy of good." In the context of the Marine Corps "zero defects" mentality, he asserts it is better to execute the "good" plan now, rather than wait for the perfect plan to be developed, issued too late to be effective.

General (RET) James H. Polk authored an article in Armor Magazine entitled "The Criticality of Time in Combat." His thesis is that the advantages of time and space accrue in geometric proportion, rather than arithmetic. He proceeds to cite historical examples to illustrate his argument. He further discusses the importance of time by showing how it was best used by different commanders to allow them a decisive advantage on the battlefield. "Again, time is not critical, it is priceless."¹⁶

An excellent "Time Management Model" is presented by LTC John W. Wild in Infantry Magazine. The focus of his effort is to illustrate a model that assists a commander in managing time while simultaneously assisting in the training

of his personnel. It is important to him to inculcate to his staff the procedures so they become SOP. The key to his model is consistency, the staff continues to perform the same functions and provide the same information regardless of the level of stress or the cumulative effects of sleep deprivation.

Additionally, he discusses the importance of cross-training personnel so there is redundancy in the command and control cells, and continually emphasizes the importance of rendering recurring requirements to SOP. He stresses the importance of adhering to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, indicating a well trained staff can present a coherent OPORD in less than one third of the time available. The aim of the model is to get the order issued consistently on time, as complete as possible, and as coherent as possible to ensure mission accomplishment. "A good order issued on time, is much better than a perfect order issued late."¹⁷

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) disseminates information periodically from the lessons learned at the Combat Training Centers. This information is released in the form of bulletins and newsletters. The Fall 1988 issue, discussed time management considerations while addressing the Command and Control battlefield operating system. "Manage time wisely" is the first command and control consideration.¹⁸ Techniques to manage time better are discussed. Included is the use of SOPs. Use of

functional SOPs can reduce staff coordination time, greatly simplify orders and simplify cross attachment, all contributing to better management of time.

Additional discussion centered upon establishing a time-critical task list based upon the requirements of each mission. Once the time line is established, it must be enforced. Use of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule is a good guide, but consideration of the amount of daylight is also important.

"Better is the enemy of good enough."¹⁹ This was the guidance provided during the discussion of operations order preparation. "There is a time beyond which perfecting the plan will seriously disrupt subordinate planning and preparation."²⁰

The Spring 1989 Newsletter focused upon non-mechanized forces, but presented time management considerations that transcended the type of unit under consideration. Again, the issue of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule appears, with emphasis on the leaders ensuring the greatest amount of time is provided to the subordinates. Additional discussion is provided on the prioritization of tasks and use of a time line. Use of the reverse planning technique was suggested for constructing the time line.

"It is better to provide a good plan quickly and to refine it later, than to delay preparation until the best plan is completed and time limited."²⁰ This was the key time management advice presented in the August 1989 CALL

Newsletter. In this discussion, clearly articulated commander's intent was also stressed.

The June 1990 CALL Newsletter presented a fictional story entitled "The Musicians of Mars." The story was designed to discuss synchronization issues that challenge the company team commander. Time management issues were addressed. Included were delegation, commander's intent and use of a time line.

"Time management is a problem." This observation is noted in the October 1989 CALL Newsletter. This newsletter focused upon "NCO Lessons Learned." The author suggests time is not used effectively during the preparation phase of most missions. One suggestion to help remedy this problem was having NCOs take the lead in this area. Additionally, the article discussed establishing priorities of work, ensuring SOPs are complete and used, and preparing for missions with information available from the warning order instead of waiting until the operations order is issued to begin work. The backwards planning technique is discussed as the most effective technique for planning the use of time.

Summary

The purpose of this literature review was to determine the current state of information available on the subject of time management. It was conducted in three phases. First,

the general subject of time management was reviewed. Then, Army doctrinal publications were examined to identify what time management information was presented. Finally, a review of contemporary military literature was conducted to determine what time management information was being discussed in the field. The constant theme that seems to emerge is the effective employment of several principles which contribute to efficient management. These principles are:

1. Establish and adhere to a time line
2. Adhere to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule
3. Properly train staff and subordinates
4. Delegate authority
5. Provide a clear commander's intent
6. Fix responsibility for delegated tasks
7. Anticipate requirements
8. Supervise and inspect
9. Prioritize work
10. Establish SOPs and use them

These principles will be defined operationally and used in the research described in chapter three of this document. Furthermore, they will provide a framework for analysis and discussion of the data in chapter four.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Time is the irretrievable factor in
war.

Napoleon Bonaparte

The methodology used in this study will closely follow the scientific method. A popular construct for such research is outlined in Paul D. Leedy's Practical Research, Planning and Design.² This research will proceed using this outline as a model.

The first subproblem will determine what activities are symptomatic of time management deficiencies within task force operations. To answer this question, data from the take home packages of six task force rotations conducted at the NTC will be analyzed. The selection of these six task forces will be completely at random.

A task force rotation at the NTC consists of six to eight missions fought over a period of more than two weeks. The training missions are sequenced into a combat scenario which flows continuously throughout the exercise.

The associate take home package consists of data from the task force and each company (four or five), for

each mission, as well as observations for the combat trains and tactical operations center for each mission.

Since there has not been a focused rotation to study the issue of time management, I will screen all observations to determine what, if any, time management issues emerge. I will place the findings into three distinct categories, reflecting three command and control nodes within the task force: the company team command post (CP), The combat trains command post (CTCP) and the battalion task force tactical operations center (TOC). Each of these command and control nodes represents the nerve center of their respective elements, the location responsible for making critical decisions (or failing to make decisions) which affect the management of available time.

For each rotation, the data will be presented in three sections. Section I will be presented in matrix format and include the instances a parameter under study was identified by the OCs as experiencing a problem. Section II will present selected lessons learned as identified by the observer controllers (OCs) for a specific element during a particular mission. These lessons will be those with specific time management issues. Section III will present general comments generated by the OCs included in the text of the take home package which include time management issues.

The parameters for examining the effective management of available time will be the adherence of the leader to certain principles and the leader's completion of specific critical tasks. The principles were presented at the conclusion of chapter two and will be operationally defined following the matrix in this chapter. The critical tasks are those tasks that were determined to be significant to the successful accomplishment of the mission, based upon the literature review.

The critical tasks deemed appropriate for analysis are rehearsals, precombat checks and precombat inspections, and whether or not the element issued an operations order. The reason for selecting these tasks were two-fold. First, they are important for successful mission accomplishment. Second, their completion was generally identifiable given the data used for the research in this study. One final parameter used is higher headquarters interference. It will be discussed with the others in this chapter.

The matrix used is presented on the following page. The left column represents the criteria analyzed. The units (nodes) are reflected in the top row. The numbers shown in the text of the matrix indicate the specific mission that the command and control node in question experienced a problem with time management.

Section I: OC Identified Deficiencies (By Mission)

Table 1.-- Research Results Matrix Format

UNIT	TM A	TM B	TM C	TM D	E CO	CTCP	TOC
PARAMETER							
ADHERE TO TIME LINE							
1/3 - 2/3 RULE							
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE							
STAFF TRAINING							
DELEGATE TASKS							
COMMANDER INTENT							
FIX RESPONSIBILITY							
ANTICIPATE							
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT							
PRIORITIZE WORK							
USE OF SOPs							
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)							
CONDUCT PCC/PCI							
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD							

The mission sequence will be provided in this space. The numbers in the matrix indicate that a problem was identified by the OC for that particular mission. The absence of a number indicates the OC made no negative remarks for that element in that particular mission.

Parameters for Analysis

The parameters for analysis require operational definition. These parameters were the issues analyzed during the research and are presented in the first column of the matrix. The definition reflects what conditions were used during the research to determine whether a problem of time management may have existed. If a problem was indicated by the OC, the mission that was identified is reflected in the matrix for the appropriate element.

- A. Adhere to Time line: Did the unit establish a time line, did they adhere to it?
- B. 1/3 - 2/3 Rule: Did the unit adhere to this rule. The unit must use one third, or less, of the planning time available, allowing two thirds or more of the planning time for subordinate elements.
- C. Higher Headquarters Interference: If the data reveals the higher headquarters interfered with a subordinate's time, it is noted to help account for possible lack of task completion.
- D. Staff Training: Was inadequate subordinate or staff training mentioned as a shortcoming?
- E. Delegate Tasks: Does the data state that key leaders failed to delegate tasks?
- F. Commander's Intent: Was an inadequate commander's intent cited in the data?
- G. Fix Responsibility: Was the element criticized for failing to fix responsibility?
- H. Anticipate: Was the element criticized for failing to anticipate?
- I. Supervise / inspect: Was the element criticized for failing to supervise or inspect?
- J. Prioritize Work: Did the element fail to establish or publish a priority of work?
- K. Use of SOPs: Was it noted by the OCs that the unit failed to have or use a functional SOP?
- L. Rehearsal: Was the element cited for failing to conduct a rehearsal, or for conducting an inadequate rehearsal?
- M. Conduct PCC/PCI: Was the unit cited for failing to conduct, or conducting inadequate precombat checks or precombat inspections?

- N. No / Incomplete OPORD: Did the unit fail to conduct an operations order, or was it criticized for presenting an inadequate OPORD?

Section II: Lessons Learned (Time Management issues)

- A. Company Operations
- B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP)
- C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

This section will list the specific "Lessons Learned" provided by the OCs which have time management implications. These lessons learned will be categorized by the type of command and control node to which they apply. The comments relevant to each company of the task force are grouped together.

For each mission, the OCs provide specific lessons learned for each unit. Generally speaking, there are three or four lessons learned for each unit for each training mission conducted. Since there are no "focused" rotations specifically seeking time management issues or problems, this section may be highlighting substantial time management problems by virtue of the fact that the issue was important enough to emerge in its own right as a "lesson learned".

Section III: OC Observations Pertaining to Time Management

- A. Company operations
- B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP)
- C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

This section presents specific comments made by the OCs during the text of the take home package. The comments selected have specific time management implications. As in

section II, these comments will be categorized by the command and control node to which they apply. Again, all company operations comments are grouped together.

These comments are provided to establish an inferential base of data which tends to indicate further the training unit experienced problems with time management. Often included with these comments are suggestions for remedying the problem. These suggestions are included with the comments in this section.

A synopsis, analysis and discussion of this data are located in chapter four. The specific data for each mission identified during the research for this study are located in Appendix B.

Limitations of the Data

It is important to qualify the utility of the data used in this research. By virtue of their randomness, the take home packages represent comments from more than one OC team at the NTC. The take home data is presented in different formats with different focuses. Most likely, these differences represent the personality and focus of the senior OC in charge of the team. It would appear from the data that one OC team seeks out specific time management problems, while others mention them only if they appear to be significant.

There is no indication of what the OC was charged to analyze when he performed his duties. As such, the data can only be taken at face value. If a comment is provided that indicates there was a problem with time management, then it is concluded a problem was experienced by that particular unit and it is so noted. A lack of comments may mean that the unit experienced no difficulty managing its time, or it could mean this particular OC was oriented towards a different agenda. Consequently, no analysis or conclusions will be drawn from the absence of comments.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Death in war is incidental; loss of time is criminal.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

The results of the research outlined in chapter three will be presented and discussed in this chapter. First, a recapitulation of the information from all task force rotations will be presented, in matrix format. Following this roll-up will be analysis and discussion of the data. This analysis and discussion will be presented in the same format and in the same sequence as presented in chapter three, "parameters for analysis." Specific "lessons learned" and "OC observations" will be used to facilitate the discussion.

The entire data base will not be presented in this chapter. The time management information which was extracted from the raw data is provided in its entirety in Appendix B. In its own right, it presents a credible inferential basis to draw conclusions as to whether or not time management is a problem within task force operations. The intent of not presenting all of the data in this chapter

is to provide a more useful format for presentation and reduce the volume of data for discussion.

Recapitulation of the Data

The three columns in the following matrix depict the three command and control nodes used for research in this study. This data is a cumulative reflection of the data presented in the six matrices located in Appendix B. The numbers shown in the numerators of the figures reflect the number of missions that a particular parameter was mentioned as having deficiencies or experiencing difficulties by the OCs. The denominator reflects the number of missions that the specified command and control node performed during the course of the six task force rotations used for this study.

To obtain the number of missions for each command and control node, the following computations were used. For the number of company missions observed during this study, each company in each task force was multiplied by the number of missions it performed during its rotation. These figures were then added together. Specifically, the number of companies in the six task forces were 5, 4, 5, 4, 5, and 4 respectively, as indicated in each task force "OC IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES (By Mission)" matrix (Appendix B). The number of missions that each of these companies experienced during their NTC rotation was 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, and 7, respectively, as depicted by the mission sequence at the bottom of each

matrix. The mathematics reveal the number of company missions for each task force was 40, 32, 40, 28, 35 and 28, respectively. Therefore, the total number of company missions analyzed for this study is 205, the sum. This number is reflected as the denominator for the company column in the following matrix.

Since there is only one CTCP and TOC per task force, the computations for these command and control nodes are more direct. Using the same procedure outlined above, there were 45 CTCP missions and 45 TOC missions analyzed in this research. These figures represent the denominators reflected in the following matrix for the CTCP and the TOC.

Before proceeding, it is important to review the limitations of the data. The numerator reflected in the matrix indicates the number of command and control nodes the OCs specifically reported as experiencing a deficiency in the context of the parameter shown. The data can only be taken at face value. There is no indication the OC was required to mention time management problems during the course of performing his duties, nor that the OC was required to make observations of the unit in the context of the parameter used for this study. The problems may have been more frequent, but not reported. These figures reflect the minimum number of command and control nodes experiencing problems (number of missions) as shown in the six NTC take home packages used for this study.

Table 2.--Frequency of Observations (Recapitulation of data from TFs 1-6)

UNIT PARAMETER	ALL COMPANIES	CTCP	TOC
ADHERE TO TIME LINE	70/205	0	6/45
1/3 - 2/3 RULE	23/205	0	1/45
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE	10/205	0	3/45
STAFF TRAINING	13/205	1/45	0
DELEGATE TASKS	0	0	0
COMMANDER INTENT	9/205	0	1/45
FIX RESPONSIBILITY	2/205	0	0
ANTICIPATE	2/205	1/45	0
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT	48/205	0	4/45
PRIORITIZE WORK	43/205	0	2/45
USE OF SOPs	14/205	2/45	11/45
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)	91/205	6/45	12/45
CONDUCT PCC/PCI	63/205	7/45	1/45
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD	28/205	1/45	0

The remainder of this chapter will present and discuss the results of the research conducted for this study. The format will follow the parameters presented in the matrix above, integrated with discussion. The "Lessons Learned" provided by the OCs will be presented as they apply to a particular parameter. They indicate significant evidence that a deficiency exists by virtue of the fact they emerged in their own right as lessons learned. Additional anecdotal evidence is provided in the general observations presented by the OCs. Many of those comments which have specific time management implications will be presented.

Analysis of the data reveals many of the problems are not isolated to a specific command and control node. For example, failure to establish and adhere to a time line was a problem experienced by units in general, not isolated to TOCs or company CPs specifically. As such, analysis will focus on the trends themselves, and report the command and control node specificity as it appears to be of significance or otherwise offers better understanding of the problem.

General Comments

To introduce the data, some of the general lessons learned and comments will be provided and discussed. It should be noted many of the comments and lessons learned presented in this chapter may not fit exactly in the category to which they were placed, or some may have

applicability to more than one parameter. Not knowing the intent of the OC when he made the comment, and to avoid duplication of comments, these comments were placed into the category where they seemed to "best fit."

There was only one general time management lesson learned which did not specifically apply to one of the parameters presented in the matrix. "Time analysis must be an integral part of mission analysis and must be conducted continuously until the mission is accomplished."² This comment was rendered by a company OC.

There were, however, many general comments which directly suggested the unit experienced time management difficulties. At the company level, these comments include:

- Misuse of time was the commander's greatest problem.
- The ability to manage time has not improved and has hindered prep.
- The company does not effectively utilize its time.
- There was no time management, no control of time.³

Comments such as these were not limited to company operations. Although no general comments were presented for the CTCF operations, there were many for the TOC:

- The TF prep still remained inadequate. The TF OPORD was issued late. With the use of any initiative on the part of the S-3, the planning process would have started the night before. Nothing in this task force starts on time. The time line, when developed, was not approved by the commander and was never updated based upon METT-T.
- Time management is inadequate. The Task Force does not understand the use of warning orders.
- Time management continued to be a problem. The OPORD was issued late and daylight subsequently wasted for rehearsals at company level.

- The TOC and staff were not prepared to plan. They did not establish a time line or make any sequential plan for developing an order.
- The time management system followed by the TF did not work effectively.
- The TF prep for the delay was inadequate. Time management continues to be poor. The OPORD lacked detail and was issued late. Subsequently, the engineer effort lost valuable time.
- Throughout the exercise, prep time was squandered and rehearsals ineffective.
- The 16 hours of prep time was not analyzed or managed.

As stated in these general comments, significant time management problems surfaced within these units. The following discussion of the data will attempt to isolate problems within a specific parameter and further attempt to quantify the frequency of the deficiency, within the limitations of the data.

Adhere to Time Line

The first parameter discussed is whether or not an element established and adhered to a time line. Over 1/3 of the company operations were cited for failing to meet this requirement (70/205). Additionally, 6/45 TOC missions were identified as having this deficiency.

There were several specific lessons learned which addressed the utility of a time line. "Time lining critical tasks is key to ensuring all tasks are completed."⁵ Additionally, "the commander must incorporate Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) with a realistic time line using backwards planning."⁶ The TLPs will be discussed in greater detail in

this chapter and the technique of backwards planning will be discussed further in chapter five.

Additional lessons learned include "placing priorities of work onto the time line"⁷ and scheduling a sleep plan for key leaders and using the time line to help track and enforce it. Additional functions of a time line are to schedule link up of cross-attachments and also to track the construction of fighting positions and the emplacement of barrier material, especially when key assets are allocated to subordinate units for limited periods of time.

Additional observations made by the OCs generally supported one of the lessons learned. Two other areas addressed include using a time line in the TOC to assist in tracking preparation efforts, and using this time line to help focus all elements during the preparation phase of an operation.

1/3 - 2/3 Rule

"Observe the 1/3 - 2/3 rule to allow subordinates maximum time to prepare for a mission."⁸ This lesson learned is merely reinforcement of a doctrinal principle, but indicates the unit failed to adhere to it. This deficiency was specifically cited in 23/205 company missions and 6/45 TOC missions. Additionally, it was alluded to frequently in lessons learned and other OC comments.

Other comments made by the OCs in this area of interest were usually a simple statement to the effect "the 1/3 - 2/3 rule was not observed."⁹ Occasionally, there was more detail provided such as "the task force used almost 60% of the available time"¹⁰ or "2/3 of the available time was used for planning by the company, only 1/3 was given to the platoons."¹¹

Higher Headquarters Interference

A unit's failure to complete critical tasks could have been a result of the time being consumed by its higher headquarters. As such, this parameter was analyzed. The frequency of this occurring was reported 10/205 times by company OCs and 3/45 times by the TOC OCs. The comments generated by the lessons learned and OC observations indicate this problem may have occurred with greater frequency than the specific mentions reflected on the matrix.

The lessons learned attributed the fact that "platoons consistently receive OPORDS in the dark and rehearse in the dark"¹² because the battalion fails to allocate enough time for them to adequately prepare for combat. Another problem which emerged was poor use of time due to "continuous changes."¹³ In this regard, a dilemma is presented to the commander when trying to keep subordinates informed. Keeping them as informed as he is an admirable goal, unless

changes continue to cause subordinates to prepare for missions they will not execute. This results in frustration experienced by the subordinate units, in addition to inadequate preparation for the mission they will ultimately execute.

The additional comments presented by the OCs supported the lessons learned. One additional consideration was the travel time to and from meetings. The commander must consider the overall effect of a meeting on each of his subordinates, and whether the meeting is actually necessary.

Staff Training

The issue of staff and subordinate training was not reported with much frequency, appearing 13/205 times within company operations and once within the CTCP. The issue was not specifically cited during the TOC operations.

This issue did emerge twice during the lessons learned. "In the absence of the commander, critical tasks must be conducted."¹⁴ In this specific instance, the company commander was required to attend numerous briefings and meetings at the TOC, and in his absence, no preparation occurred. It was implied the commander's subordinates were not properly trained to function independently in his absence. The other lesson learned referred to a task force staff which "did not take advantage of available time to further refine the plan and develop decision support

products."¹⁵ This situation might also be attributed to poor morale, bad leadership or other problems, but these were not specifically stated and are outside the context of this research. The key point is, in the judgement of the OC, time available was not properly used by the staff.

The OC observations provide additional anecdotal evidence that inadequate staff and subordinate training contributes to inefficient use of time. One company OC noted that "nothing was done in the commander's absence."¹⁶ Another company OC reported that the company commander properly delegated priorities of work prior to his departure to the task force order and rehearsal; "however, the inexperienced junior leadership did not follow through."¹⁷

These problems of training subordinates surfaced in the CTCP and TOC as well. Due to improper training of other personnel, "when the S-4 became a casualty, the CTCP became totally unfunctional."¹⁸ Cross-training of personnel in the TOC is important in order "to achieve depth in the planning so time is not lost due to the absence of key primary planners, for any reason."¹⁹

Delegate Tasks

Delegation of tasks was never mentioned as a key issue by the OCs. It never emerged as a lesson learned nor is it depicted on the matrix in the frequency of observations. The only time it was mentioned as being a

problem was during one company mission when the OC observed "the team never identified critical tasks, assigned responsibilities or supervised the conduct of the prep."²⁰ This observation notes several problems, one of them being delegation of tasks.

Commander's Intent

Inadequate commander's intent was noted for 9/205 company missions and once in the conduct of TOC operations. The lessons learned for this parameter often comprised of the observation, "the commander's intent must be clear."²¹ If this is achieved, then, "in the absence of orders, execute."²² One lesson learned captures the essence of the issues concerning commanders intent.

When time is short, actions must happen quickly. There is no substitute for a plan that describes the specific task/purpose of the main effort, the task and purpose of the co/tm's, special platoons and the other combat multipliers which will influence or support the main effort. This mission order must be supported by adequate graphics, to include a concept for counter-recon repositioning and use of the reserve. When everyone understands the results each subordinate must achieve (task) and what their unique contribution is (the why), it provides a common base that either can be executed as planned or rapidly adapted to meet a changing situation. During the execution, if the intent (what must be done) is understood, graphics are adequate, and lateral commo exists within the TF, then subordinates can use their initiative to achieve the "how" to complete the mission. When this is not done, subordinates usually receive FRAGOs sending them in different directions so there is rarely a coordinated effort among the units in the fight.²³

Fix Responsibility

The OCs provided little direct feedback in the arena of fixing responsibility. It was noted to be a problem in two of the company missions. It was not addressed in the CTCP or TOC operations. No lessons learned were reported.

Anticipate

The area of anticipation did not receive much direct feedback either. Only 2/205 company missions were cited as having deficiencies in this area, and only one CTCP mission. However, there were many lessons learned and other OC comments which indicated problems with anticipation.

The majority of the lessons learned centered on actively seeking planning guidance from the higher headquarters, or beginning to plan with whatever information is available. "Do not hesitate to plan, even if the operation from higher headquarters is incomplete."²⁴ It is implied from this lesson learned that sufficient information should be available in the warning order to begin the planning process. The OC further states, "Missions can be deduced from the situation, they need not be derived solely from specified tasks."²⁵ A key to this comment is, assess the situation and then ask for clarification or additional guidance, even though directives may not be complete.

Another OC asserts, "Do not waste planning and preparation time. The commander needs to seek all available

information."²⁶ The lesson here is, once the commander becomes aware of a possible mission, he should seek out more information to begin work at his level. The converse of this philosophy is to simply await the task force order before beginning any priorities of work at the company level. While the data reflects this did occur occasionally, it was always suggested to be the least preferred course of action.

The other lessons learned presented in the take home packages were more specific to a unit or a mission. In one mission, the OC advised the commander to develop reconnaissance tasks early and assign them to subordinates to "maximize the use of time and assist in the decision making process."²⁷ Defensive missions usually challenge commanders with maximizing engineer assets which are usually available for only limited periods of time. Tracking the progress of engineer efforts and designating a "CINC dozer" were two additional lessons learned.

The majority of the additional comments directly support the lessons learned. One exception was this observation by an OC, "the TOC did not execute its movement as planned because soldiers were still sleeping in their sleeping bags."²⁸ This statement implies that the junior leaders did not anticipate the displacement of the TOC and ensure the soldiers were ready to move, despite the fact the movement was scheduled in advance as part of the plan.

Supervise and Inspect

This parameter identified many units experiencing difficulties. Almost 25% of the company missions (48/205), and almost 10% of the TOC missions (4/45) were cited by the OCs as suffering shortfalls. Generally, the OCs were insistent that leaders were not adequately involved in supervising and inspecting. "Trust is not a substitute for supervision. Professionals are not insulted when leaders check for compliance of orders or intent."²⁹ Another lesson learned, which appeared more than once, simply stated "leaders must supervise and inspect their elements."³⁰ This issue is not restricted to any particular level. A company OC reported "adherence to the TLP and supervision of prioritized tasks will result in successful mission accomplishment"³¹ while a TOC OC reported "the XO must supervise the staff and manage available planning time."³²

These lessons learned were supported with numerous OC observations and comments. Generally, these comments criticized the unsatisfactory level of leader involvement at all echelons. These comments were directed at the lowest levels of leadership, at squad leaders who failed to ensure their soldiers "had sufficient class V and were in the proper uniform."³³ Battalion commanders were not immune to OC criticism in this area. "The commander and staff did not go forward on the battlefield to supervise and inspect the preparation efforts of subordinate units."³⁴ Consequently,

the task force was not ready for the mission, and the commander was not aware of this fact.

Prioritize Work

Failure of units to prioritize work was noted frequently by the OCs. 43/205 company missions and 2 of the TOC missions were specifically identified as having problems in this area. The most frequently cited lesson learned was simply that "priorities needed to be established, and checked."³⁵ Additional lessons learned include:

- Time management and prioritization of tasks are critical components of success. There are many tasks to be accomplished and too little time. The commander must prioritize to ensure the most critical tasks are accomplished.
- Establish priorities of work and hold subordinate leaders accountable.
- The entire prep must be tightly managed through the use of detailed, centralized planning and decentralized execution. There is never enough time to do everything, so tasks must be prioritized and executed to accomplish as much as possible.
- When time is short, prioritize the tasks that must be completed to successfully complete the mission. Even though you may not complete all of the tasks, those most important to your success will be accomplished.
- Develop and enforce priority of work for occupation of assembly areas and defensive positions. There should be a reverse time schedule prepared for every mission.
- Little to nothing occurred during the preparation. A specific problem was time management and a failure to identify specific tasks leaders and soldiers should have accomplished.
- Prioritize the events you need to rehearse.³⁶

Although not exhaustive, these comments provide an extensive picture of the information presented by the OCs by way of their lessons learned, feedback mechanism.

Generally, the additional comments reinforced these lessons. One additional comment which provided notable amplification to the lessons learned was in the feedback provided by a TOC OC. He noted, "no time line was posted to assist the TOC operation's section in tracking critical tasks."³⁷ Further, he stated, "This lack of effort to manage critical tasks hindered the task force's preparation."³⁸ Obviously, it is difficult for a commander to knowingly influence a situation if he is not aware of where his influence may be best placed.

Use of SOPs

Not having a functional SOP, or not using one that a unit had available was reported as a shortcoming in fourteen company missions, two CTCF missions and eleven TOC missions. The lessons learned reflected that soldiers did not use the SOP.

Suggestions were provided to the CTCFs to improve their SOPs to better facilitate information flow. Specifically, reports formats which are reduced to SOP are more thorough and efficient, and reduce the time required for radio transmission. A similar comment was rendered in the observations portion where an OC noted "several ammo shortages occurred within the TF as a result of inaccurate status reports."³⁹ It was implied that a functional SOP could have allowed the unit to avoid this problem.

The planning process was identified as an area which could be improved if certain items were codified and included in the unit SOP. For example, a unit should commit "a formal orders process"⁴⁰ to SOP to better define roles and responsibilities. Additionally, the "planning sequence should take into account a compressed time schedule,"⁴¹ another issue which lends itself to being incorporated into a unit's SOP.

Rehearsals

"Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse."⁴² This is the lesson learned provided by a company OC. Rehearsals were reported as being inadequate or nonexistent for 91/205 company missions, 6/45 CTCF missions and 12/45 TOC missions. The majority of the lessons learned suggested that important problems would be resolved by rehearsals. "A rehearsal would have shown the area was critical and required more graphic control measures."⁴³ Another OC notes, "rehearsals are imperative in refining the plan and overcoming unforeseen problems in execution."⁴⁴ Still another suggests "a rehearsal is essential to ensure understanding of the plan and validate decision support criteria."⁴⁵ A final lesson learned challenged the quality of rehearsals. "If rehearsals are not SOP, they are doomed to failure. They are worse than no rehearsals at all because they waste valuable time."⁴⁶

All of the lessons learned indicated rehearsals were important for mission success at any level. The value of rehearsals increased as planning time was reduced since rehearsals could solidify the plan in the minds of subordinates and provide a common point of departure for FRAGOs, if it should become necessary. The continuing, underlying theme presented in all the lessons learned was, "rehearsals are critical to mission success."⁴⁷

Many of the additional observations provided by the OCs suggest that rehearsals were not prioritized in the list of tasks required to be accomplished. As such, they were often not conducted, even if sufficient time was available. If time was short, rehearsals were even less likely to be conducted.

Finally, many OC observations suggested the quality of rehearsals left much to be desired. Often, the "rehearsal" was actually a briefing or war gaming session instead of a synchronization mechanism to reinforce the plan and resolve any conflicts or uncoordinated details.

Precombat Checks and Precombat Inspections (PCC/PCI)

As units began to suffer stress associated with the long rotation schedule and associated sleep deprivation, PCC/PCI began to suffer. The 63/205 company missions, 7/45 CTCP missions and one TOC mission had OCs report no or inadequate precombat checks and inspections.

Many of the lessons learned suggested the leadership's failure to supervise was the principle reason for this problem. Additional comments indicated that a lack of time available was not always the cause for incomplete PCC/PCIs. Most often, comments stated no cause, they merely noted that PCC/PCI were not conducted, or were incomplete.

No or Incomplete OPORD

"Ensure a detailed, five-paragraph OPORD is issued so everyone understands the mission and the commander's intent."⁴⁸ The 28/205 company missions were identified as having no or incomplete operations orders, as well as one CTCP mission. The usual problem was a lack of detail serious enough to jeopardize the unit's ability to accomplish the mission.

The lessons learned suggest not everyone in the task force is routinely provided the information from an operations order. This seems to be particularly true of support personnel in the medical platoon, UMCP and combat trains. Often, the information provided to the key personnel of the task force lacks important information, such as the task force OPORD missing the CSS annex and overlay. These two products are often promised at the operations order briefing to be delivered at a later time. They often are not delivered, or are delivered too late to be effectively distributed to the user level.

An additional comment rendered by an OC was the staff did not always include all key personnel in the planning session. As a result, key information may be omitted and not available for consideration for key decisions.

Troop Leading Procedures (TLP)

The Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) emerged as a parameter many units experienced difficulties with. It is worthy of discussion here, and will be addressed further in chapter five. The main theme presented in the lessons learned was the unit did not understand the TLP or just failed to follow the TLP.

The problems associated with adhering to the TLP were discovered in lessons learned at all levels within task force operations. They were noted as problems with company operations in comments as, "the company commander does not understand the TLP"⁴⁹ and "not following the TLP or adhering to a published time line hindered the prep."⁵⁰ At the TOC, an OC noted "time management continued to impact on the subordinate's ability to parallel plan and conduct effective TLP."⁵¹

Some very helpful comments appeared in the OC observations pertaining to time management. One company OC noted "the ability to develop plans and orders without much available time can be accomplished if TLPs are understood

and exercised."⁵² Another suggested to "use preparation time efficiently by conducting the TLP steps concurrently and task subordinate leaders with recon responsibility."⁵³

Additional comments were generated by the TOC OCs. "The plan was not the result of an organized, time lined planning effort. It consumed far more of the subordinate's time than necessary."⁵⁴ The improper use of TLP was inferred in this instance, while specifically addressed by another OC who noted "TLP must be used concurrently at all levels."⁵⁵

Conclusion

The data reflect many instances where time is not managed in an efficient manner. Even though the OCs had no apparent specific focus to isolate and study time management issues, these issues continued to emerge as a problem. The data presented in the matrix begin to quantify the magnitude of the problem, but the results are inconclusive since the OCs had no apparent requirement to report findings relative to the parameters selected for this study.

A similar phenomenon exists with the information reported by the OCs as lessons learned or in random comments prevalent throughout the take home packages. That a time management issue is presented as a lesson learned is significant since the data suggest the issue emerged in its own right as a lesson learned by the training unit. There

is no indication the OC had any reason to seek out time management issues.

Substantial anecdotal evidence emerges to reinforce the suggestions provided by the data that time management is a problem within task force operations. Quantification of this conclusion would be difficult given the limitations of the available data. However, the conclusion is inescapable, time management was a problem for these six task forces in the conduct of their tactical operations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We can always recover ground, but never
lost time.

Field Marshall Graf von Gnesenau

The purpose of this chapter is to provide conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the research. First, the conclusions of this study will be presented. Second, a proposed time management philosophy will be discussed. Techniques and procedures will be offered which compliment and amplify the analysis presented in chapter four, and support the proposed time management philosophy. Recommendations drawn from this study will be presented at the end of this chapter.

Conclusions

The first subproblem asked what activities were symptomatic of time management deficiencies within battalion task force operations. Based upon the literature review, fourteen parameters were selected for analysis. The research established the six task forces used in this study

received negative comments from the OCs pertaining to each of these parameters, as depicted in the table on page 36.

Given the results of the research and the random nature of the population used for this study, I conclude the following activities may be symptomatic of time management deficiencies in armored and mechanized infantry battalion task forces throughout the Army:

1. Failure to publish or adhere to a time line
2. Violation of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule
3. Inadequate staff and subordinate training
4. Inadequate commander's intent
5. Failure to fix responsibility
6. Failure to anticipate
7. Inadequate supervision and inspection
8. Failure to prioritize work
9. Failure to use functional SOPs
10. Inadequate rehearsals
11. Incomplete PCC/PCI
12. Incomplete operations orders

Two of the parameters discussed in chapter three are not reflected in the list above. They are accounted for in the following manner. The issue of "delegate tasks" was never specifically addressed by the OCs, therefore no conclusions were drawn. However, this issue will be discussed in the proposed time management philosophy presented later in this chapter.

The second parameter not listed above is "higher headquarters interference." The purpose of focusing on this area in the study was to help account for a unit's ineffective time management if problems could be identified which were beyond the unit's control. Only three such instances of higher headquarters interference were reported

from outside of the task force operations. During the course of 45 missions conducted by the six task forces in the sample population, these three instances were deemed insignificant in light of the other findings. No additional problems addressed by the OCs in the take home packages could be attributed specifically to ineffective time management.

The second subproblem asked if sufficient guidance existed in the Army to facilitate effective time management within task force operations. The literature review conducted in Chapter Two indicated the doctrinal guidance was incomplete. It is incomplete for two major reasons.

The first reason pertains to the nature of the guidance available in doctrinal publications. Army manuals lack specificity pertaining to many techniques and procedures which are currently available. Based upon the Field Manuals that were reviewed, the doctrinal guidance focuses primarily on "what to do." Information on "how to do it" is conspicuously absent. Review of contemporary military literature supports this contention and offers many techniques and procedures, as do the frequent publications from the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Military professionals continue writing these techniques and procedures to fill the void left by the current Army manuals.

Second, the available Army doctrinal publications do not consolidate time management information to make it readily available to the leaders who need it. No single document is comprehensive in this respect. As discussed in Chapter Two, there are many documents which do address time management issues, but time management is a subordinate discussion of some other issue.

Information and guidance pertaining to such a critical command and control issue as the management of time should be more capsulized and readily available to our leaders in the field. It is not reasonable to expect each leader to conduct extensive research on his own or have to discover for himself effective time management techniques and procedures.

The third subproblem asked if techniques and procedures were available to improve time management in task force operations. As discussed above, the review of literature indicated there are many techniques and procedures available that address this issue. Comments generated by the OCs add additional emphasis to this fact. Discussion of many of these techniques and procedures will be presented later in this chapter.

The primary research question asked if time management was a problem within battalion task force operations. The results of this study clearly indicate that a problem does

exist. The conclusion is inescapable, time management is a problem within task force operations.

To quantify the extent time management is a problem within task force operations is beyond the scope of this research, given the limitations of the available data. This issue is discussed further in the recommendations at the end of this chapter.

Contributions of This Study

It is important to note the two major contributions of this study. The first contribution of this study is providing an answer to the thesis question, perhaps causing the Army senior leadership to focus on a problem area now that it is clearly identified. The second contribution of this study is consolidation of techniques and procedures which contribute to the effective management of time. Recommendations for the implementation of these contributions are discussed at the end of this chapter.

The research is quite conclusive in answering the subproblems and the primary thesis question. This study has shown time management to be a problem. Further, it has isolated specific problem areas which are symptomatic of time management deficiencies. Finally, the research concludes current information is not adequately capsulized or formatted to fix the problem. The focus of the next

portion of this chapter is to provide information in a manner that will help fix the problem.

Having identified the problem, a time management philosophy will be proposed. This discussion will be presented in two sections. First, a discussion of team building will be presented. This discussion includes staff training, cross-training, subordinate leader training and delegation. Team building will be followed by a discussion of techniques to better manage time. These techniques include SOPs, battlebooks, the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, multiple warning orders, prioritizing work, time line, tracking essential tasks, commander's intent, briefbacks, rehearsals and anticipation.

Time Management Philosophy

Due to the complexity of its nature, effective time management is proposed as a philosophy. This philosophy is defined as a process of team building, followed by consistently implementing time-efficient techniques and procedures within a unit. These techniques and procedures are inculcated into the unit and thoroughly trained so the unit consistently conducts its tasks and missions while efficiently using time. As a result, managing time effectively becomes the normal manner of conducting operations for the unit.

Effective time management cannot be mastered overnight. Rather, it is an involved process consisting of actions applied by numerous individuals at every echelon. The training of these individuals combined with the teamwork and cohesion they develop over time, allows the astute leader the opportunity to maximize time management. The goal of this philosophy is to allow a unit to consistently and efficiently conduct a multitude of tasks, at all echelons, simultaneously.

Team Building

The foundation for successful management of time is constructed long before a unit is thrust into a combat situation or deploys to a training center to begin a CTC rotation. The first step towards implementing a functional time management philosophy is building a team. A process to achieve this goal is presented in the following discussion. This process includes:

- staff training
- cross-training
- subordinate training
- delegation

Each of these parameters can be developed and trained at home station prior to deploying to combat or a CTC.

Staff Training

Training the individuals on the staff is the first step in team building. Each individual needs to be proficient in his primary duties. It is important that each individual on the team understands his duties and responsibilities and how they contribute to the success of the unit's mission. It is human nature for people to perform at a higher level when they feel they are contributing to a team effort. Often their motivation emanates from team cohesion and comraderie. Regardless, the success of the unit's mission is enhanced when individuals are proficiently trained in their primary duties.

Cross-Training

The next step is to cross-train individuals to ensure redundancy in the skills required to perform key functions. More than one soldier needs to know how to perform key tasks. The intent is to minimize degradation in unit capability due to the absence of one or two key individuals. The absence of a key individual may occur in the event of casualties or could be part of a sleep plan enforced to help facilitate consistent high-performance during continuous operations.

Every key task should have a primary and a back-up individual responsible for its completion. These individuals need to know who they are and be proficient in

accomplishing the task. A key consideration when training the staff is development of the second team of leadership.

Subordinate Leader Training

A technique for attaining a higher degree of training proficiency in units is development of the second team of leadership. The second team consists of those leaders immediately subordinate to the primary leadership. Develop this second team so it becomes intimately familiar with the responsibilities and requirements of the duty positions the next level up. These individuals need to know they have the authority, and obligation, to act in the behalf of the primary leader whenever he is absent. If the second team is properly trained, the unit will be able to function continuously since there will be no lapse in leadership. The number two man is ready and trained to do the job. Development of the second team is applicable and necessary at every level. Platoon leaders need to understand the duties and responsibilities of company commanders, platoon sergeants need to understand the duties and responsibilities of platoon leaders, etc.

Moreover, when individuals are well-trained in the requirements of their duty position as well as the next level up, the duties can be completed more systematically and with less supervision required. Regardless of how motivated they may be, soldiers not well-trained require

more detailed instruction and more continuous supervision. Neither is conducive to efficient time management.

Well-trained individuals are melded together by prudent leaders into efficient and cohesive teams. The better trained the teams, the less guidance and supervision they require from the leader. The teams will require less time to conduct their tasks, and the leader will have more time available to him to attend to other matters.

Delegate Authority and Fix Responsibility

Delegating authority and fixing responsibility did not surface as an issue in the data used for this study. I attribute this to the absence of a time management focus during data collection by the OCs. However, my personal experience as an OC showed these issues to be a common problem area experienced by units and worthy of discussion. Furthermore, they contribute to an effective time management philosophy.

A common tendency of leaders at all levels is to attempt to do too many tasks personally. Delegate authority to subordinates and fix responsibility to ensure the task is accomplished to standard. This frees the primary leaders from doing one task so they are able to supervise or check many others. A unit cannot afford for a key leader to become so engrossed with a single task that he loses

perspective of his role in the accomplishment of the mission.

During the research, many symptoms of failing to fix responsibility surfaced, specifically in such areas as conducting precombat checks and precombat inspections. The data indicated 71 missions were adversely affected by incomplete PCC/PCI. (This number includes all three command and control nodes: TOC, CTCP and company CPs.) These items are doctrinally required and should be addressed in the unit SOPs. The probable reason for their lack of completion is failure of subordinate leaders to inspect.

If the key leaders fix the responsibility of checking for completion of these items to the subordinate leaders, the items will be completed. A routine report on the status of these checks will confirm their completion for the key leader.

As part of a time management philosophy, authority should be delegated routinely by leaders consistent with the level of maturity and training of subordinates. Train subordinates to take charge of situations and follow through to completion. Ensure they are empowered with sufficient authority to accomplish these tasks. As subordinates mature, they will be capable of accomplishing tasks of increasing magnitude.

Subordinates must understand how much authority the leader has delegated to them, and what decisions he expects

them to make in his absence. This level of authority must be understood by all concerned parties. It is important to foster a command climate that encourages subordinates to make tough, calculated decisions. If a subordinate defers a decision until the leader returns to approve of it, the decision may be rendered useless due to the occurrence of other events. Not to decide is to decide.

Time will be used more efficiently when subordinate leaders make such decisions and begin to conduct the associated tasks sooner. The time spent awaiting the return of a key leader for his decision is lost.

Team building is the first step towards developing a time management philosophy. The most important consideration to improve team building is practice. There are many training opportunities available to increase the level of performance of the teams, and the unit. They include simulations, STXs, FTXs, and ARTEPs. Whenever training is conducted, training to standard and maintaining consistency are imperative. Train as you will fight.

Techniques for Saving Time

Having identified areas important to a time management philosophy, a discussion of various techniques for improving the effectiveness of time management is in order. Specific techniques discussed include:

- SOPs
- Battlebooks
- 1/3 - 2/3 rule
- Multiple warning orders
- Prioritizing work
- Use of a time line
- Tracking essential tasks
- Commander's intent
- Operations orders
- Briefbacks
- Rehearsals
- Anticipation

Although each technique will be discussed individually, it is necessary to recognize the importance of conducting them concurrently, whenever applicable.

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

The data indicated that many units failed to have a functional SOP or failed to use their SOP effectively. SOPs are orders which govern the routine functions of a unit. This document helps to facilitate rapid assimilation of new individuals and cross attached units. If a unit is habitually cross attached, ensure it has a copy of the parent unit SOP. Once all parties have a copy of the SOP, it is important they understand and use it.

The more functions that can be codified and incorporated into the unit SOP, the less will be required in an operations order. Items such as PCC/PCI should be addressed in the unit SOP. Obviously, enforcing the use of an effective SOP is far less time consuming than attempting to coordinate, direct and supervise every aspect of every operation.

The SOP should be a concise and functional document, suitable for deploying with elements to the field. If it is too large and cumbersome, it most likely will not be used. A pocket-sized document probably provides the best utility.

Units should be trained routinely in the use of their SOP. This training does not need to be a separate block of instruction competing for time on the training schedule. Whenever the unit trains, the SOP should be emphasized and exercised to the maximum extent possible. Train as you will fight.

Battlebooks

In garrison, many soldiers use a desk top reference which contains key information on how to accomplish recurring and special tasks. Soldiers who are assigned to staff sections use these handy references frequently. They contain formats, information from regulations or local policies, frequently used phone numbers, points of contact for various issues, etc. These desk-top references are

particularly useful when a new soldier is being trained, or when one soldier has to accomplish the tasks of another due to personnel absences or shortages. This concept has utility in tactical operations.

Similar in value to a tactical SOP, a duty specific battlebook can save time and enhance productivity for key duty positions. These battlebooks should be living documents which are updated and improved frequently. To ensure this is done, a review and update of battlebooks should be a standard item as part of maintenance operations when returning from field training exercises. It should be an item inspected by immediate supervisors. Battlebooks should remain with the unit when a soldier is reassigned.

The exact contents of a battlebook will vary depending on the type of unit and key duty position it represents. Battlebooks should contain duty-specific references which are used routinely during tactical missions. They should contain any information which will enable the soldiers or teams to perform their duties more efficiently. Entries could include checklists delineating the specific duties of an individual or team, specific checklists from appropriate ARTEP manuals, key extracts from field manuals or other publications, notes and any other useful information.

For example, the S-2's battlebook may contain such items as the enemy order of battle, enemy weapons

capabilities and limitations, doctrinal templates, geographic data peculiar to the area of operations, weather forecasts, special maps, etc. This saves time by permitting rapid access to key, consolidated information and may allow decisions to be made more quickly.

In developing battlebooks, it is useful to establish their specific intent. They should enhance the performance of a well-trained soldier or team by providing rapid access to key information. They will also assist in rapidly assimilating a new or replacement soldier, or assist a team member to accomplish a duty that he may not be entirely familiar with. As with unit SOP's, a bigger document is not necessarily a better document.

1/3 - 2/3 Rule

Allow appropriate planning and preparation time for subordinates. At a minimum, adhere to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. Provide more time to subordinates, if possible. Battles are fought by companies and platoons. Give them the time they need to prepare. Rigidly enforce this rule during training.

Multiple Warning Orders

A technique to enhance the flow of information to subordinates is the use of multiple warning orders. As discussed previously, there is a dilemma confronting the commander as he considers how much and when to release

information to subordinates. Disseminating too much information before he has the opportunity to conduct a detailed mission analysis may cause subordinates to prepare for missions they will never execute. Too little information could waste precious time that subordinates could be using to prepare for operations. The use of multiple warning orders is a technique which can assist a commander in contending with this issue.

Issue the first warning order immediately after receipt of the warning order from higher headquarters. This WARNORD will be very basic. It is intended to give subordinates early notice of actions or orders that are to follow. Doctrinally, it should include a brief situation, changes to task organization, earliest time of move, the nature and time of the operation, the time and place of the orders group, and critical administrative and logistical information.² Include the time line as best it can be determined.

A second warning order should be issued as soon as the command group and the planning cell have had an opportunity to conduct a more detailed mission analysis. They need time to consider relevant unit strengths, dispositions, and other key information. The second warning order is designed to provide greater detail, particularly in regard to specific subordinate unit instructions.

By no means is this second warning order an attempt to preclude the necessity for an operations order. Rather, it provides the commander an opportunity to issue more specific guidance to the unit after more deliberate consideration of all information available to him. The result is better focus for the entire unit, with specific instructions provided to applicable subordinate units earlier in the process. Using multiple warning orders creates the opportunity to begin focused preparation prior to the issuance of the operations order, taking better advantage of valuable time.

The use of multiple warning orders should be practiced in training and included in a unit's SOP. Some units may decide that a third warning order is appropriate to better enhance the time management process.

Prioritize Work

Analysis of the mission renders an extensive list of tasks required for completion. List these tasks and prioritize them. (Routine tasks addressed in the unit SOP do not need to be listed, but should still be inspected by leaders.) The priority assigned to these tasks should reflect their importance to the success of the mission.

By prioritizing tasks, subordinates will have a better focused approach when preparing for the mission. There will seldom be occasions when a leader has sufficient

time to accomplish all tasks to his satisfaction. Prioritizing tasks will help to ensure those tasks of greatest importance will be accomplished. Prioritizing tasks is applicable to every leader at every echelon.

Develop a Time Line

Develop a time line indicating when these tasks are to be initiated and completed. This time line should be a part of warning orders and updated at the operations order. Ensure changes to the time line are posted and disseminated to subordinates. Adhere to the time line.

A technique for developing a time line is use of a reverse-planning schedule. A good discussion of this technique is provided in FM 71-1.³ Reverse-planning highlights key events and signals compressed time considerations early in the planning process.

Track Essential Tasks

Track the progress of essential tasks. Post a list in the CP reflecting the current time line and the progress of essential tasks. A system for updating the status of essential tasks should be established. By having this status posted and frequently updated, the leader will have a clear picture of the status of preparation of his unit for the mission. He will be better able to shift assets or

priorities consistent with the commander's intent, making best use of available time.

Commander's Intent

The commander's intent may be the most critical ingredient to successful mission accomplishment. This is true at every echelon of command. In September 1990, General Foss, then Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, approved the current definition of commander's intent:

Intent is the commander's stated vision which defines: the purpose of an operation; the end state with respect to the relation-ship among the force, the enemy, and the terrain; and briefly how the end state will be achieved by the force as a whole.⁴

Since this approval occurred after the printing and distribution of most current, applicable doctrinal publications, there may be incomplete dissemination of this guidance to units in the field. (General Foss noted that information concerning commander's intent needed to be more clearly established in doctrine.⁵)

Due to the complex nature of the modern battlefield, compounded by communications inconsistencies and the fog of war, the commander will probably not experience complete and continuous control of all assets once the battle is joined. In spite of this battlefield reality, if subordinates understand the commander's intent

and the scheme of maneuver, they can exercise their great initiative to accomplish the mission. Additionally, a clear commander's intent will contribute significantly to the focus of subordinates during preparation for the mission. This will save time.

Operations Orders

All orders should contain certain characteristics. These characteristics include clarity, brevity, simplicity, completeness, timeliness and the authoritative expression of the commander.⁶ Packaging these characteristics into a concise order takes preparation and practice.

First, the CP must plan for a planning process. The planners cannot merely meet together and begin discussing issues. There must be succinct, purposeful activity at the CP if time is to be best managed. Each individual must come to the planning session equipped with the appropriate references, necessary tools and knowledge of his role in the process. All of these issues can be codified and incorporated into the unit SOP.

There are useful planning models available to assist the CP in conducting the planning process and developing the operations order. The Military-Decision Making Process and the Troop Leading Procedures are the doctrinally prescribed methods.⁷ Ensure all key personnel know their roles and

train for consistency. Develop the second team to enhance continuity.

While ensuring the process is well trained to consistently conduct planning to standard, consider what activities may have to be curtailed or eliminated in the event of a compressed time line. A unit can train to streamline the orders process to allow rapid adjustment for limited planning time. Procedures for a compressed time line should be included in the unit SOP.

Consistency in the staff products is imperative. Each element of the staff should understand exactly what products must be produced, and when they are needed. By producing the same product in the same format each time, the staff will have a better opportunity to consistently produce a coordinated, integrated order. There should not be a significant, time consuming learning curve experienced by the staff each mission.

Decide carefully what the final operations order should look like. More is not always better. Limit this critical document to necessary matrices, overlays and annexes. It will take less time to generate and less time to reproduce for distribution. It will also take less time for subscribers to read, understand and implement.

Consistency in this final product, the operations order, is also important. Consider assembling a modular order, one that can be broken apart for thorough and

efficient use by subordinate commanders and leaders. If the order is packaged in a modular design, a company commander will most likely dissect it upon his arrival at his company CP, distributing appropriate sections to his planners so they can begin detailed planning in their specific areas after receiving his guidance. If the operations order is always produced in the same format, with the same annexes and overlays, the using elements will always know what information to expect and where in the order it is located. This is another SOP item that can save subordinates time.

The commander should carefully determine the point at which the operation is sufficiently planned. In an environment with no time constraints, a diligent staff may continue to refine the plan until perfection is attained. Obviously, the development of the perfect plan is very elusive, if achievable. There is always one more course of action to consider, one more detail to address. There is a point at which a good plan should be finalized and briefed, allowing the remaining time to be devoted to rehearsals and additional preparation.

Provide to subordinates a solid plan early. Accept the fact that it may require revision. It will probably require revision anyway as a result of changes from higher headquarters, more definitive enemy information resulting from reconnaissance, etc. Do not use unnecessary time attempting to perfect the plan. A good plan, well

disseminated and rehearsed, is better than the "perfect" plan that is finalized too late to be effectively disseminated. "Better is the enemy of good enough."⁸

Briefbacks

A briefback is a forum where subordinates tell the commander what they are supposed to do, and why. Use of briefbacks ensures all subordinate leaders understand their missions as briefed in the operations order, and how their particular missions fit into the overall scheme of maneuver. Briefbacks also provide the commander immediate feedback as to whether or not his intent is clearly understood.

A briefback of the mission should be conducted immediately following an operations order. A good technique is to have all key subordinate leaders conduct their briefbacks in the presence of each other. Use of this technique will continue to reinforce the overall scheme of maneuver while allowing each subordinate to better understand how his particular mission relates to the others. Any questions that arise may apply to many or all subordinates, and significant coordination may occur during this early stage in the process.

Consider the time expended on briefbacks an investment. If the subordinate leaders expend thirty minutes during the briefback process, and all are better focused as they depart the CP to begin their planning, the

time has been well spent. Briefbacks help to ensure subsequent planning time used by subordinates is not wasted by misinformed subordinates expending time and resources preparing for missions that are not consistent with the commander's intentions. Briefbacks may also contribute significantly to synchronization of the fight.

Rehearsals

Rehearsals provide an opportunity to reinforce the plan, synchronize key events, and coordinate actions. To be most effective, rehearsals must be planned for.

The best time to conduct the rehearsal is after subordinate leaders have completed issuing their operations orders to their elements. This allows the troop leading procedures to be continued by their subordinates while they attend the higher echelon rehearsal. Most likely, they will come to the rehearsal with questions about the plan, specifically with issues concerning coordination or synchronization that were raised during their own planning or orders processes. Once these issues are resolved, they can inform their subordinates at their own rehearsals, which should be conducted after the higher echelon rehearsal.

The more contingencies rehearsed, the better. As long as subordinates understand the commander's intent, rehearsing contingencies will not confuse them, rather, it

will reinforce different means of accomplishing the mission. Rehearsals are applicable and necessary at every level.

Rehearsals will validate that time and space relationships are feasible. If an element is required to reposition, ensure the decision for its displacement allows for the movement in sufficient time to accomplish the mission. Rehearse the worst possible scenario. For example, rehearse displacement of the element in MOPP level IV, at night, if that is a potential requirement to complete the mission. If the decision for displacement allows enough time for the worst case scenario, it is viable. If not, select a different decision point.

Rehearse all operations to the fullest extent possible. Strive for a full, combined arms rehearsal, including all assets, on the actual terrain or terrain similar to that which you will be conducting the mission. If this is not practical, scale down the level of involvement, consistent with METT-T, striving to include as many soldiers and systems as possible.

Plan for the rehearsal. An ineffective rehearsal is worse than no rehearsal at all. It wastes subordinate's time and may actually reinforce undesired outcomes. If a sand table is used, ensure it accurately depicts the actual terrain.

A useful kit to aid in constructing sand tables for rehearsals can be prepared at home station. It may consist

of engineer tape, chalk, tent pegs, cotton balls, graphic training aids, and anything else that may help subordinates to better envision the actual battlefield. The responsibility for maintaining this kit should be fixed to ensure it is adequately stocked and available when needed.

An excellent reference for rehearsals is the April 1991 CALL Newsletter entitled "Rehearsals."³ This document provides many techniques and procedures for conducting rehearsals, as well as detailed discussion on attendees, reduced scale rehearsals, training aids and expedients.

Anticipate

Time may be more effectively used by anticipating events. Often there is sufficient information known about the situation to begin activities prior to extensive formal instructions from the higher headquarters. Perhaps a few focused questions may be directed to the higher headquarters to expedite the flow of key information which could trigger activities earlier in the process, using time to better advantage.

Specific anticipatory actions may include the positioning of forces, effecting task organization, or conducting reconnaissance within specified limits. If nothing else, activate and enforce the sleep plan. The goal should be to best use time available by accomplishing known or anticipated tasks earlier.

The majority of this chapter has been devoted to discussion of elements of a time management philosophy. It is important to remember that most elements discussed require training, practice and preparation to maximize their effectiveness. This philosophy needs to be inculcated into subordinates so it becomes the routine manner in which a unit conducts its tactical operations, thus minimizing the learning curve and maximizing the effective use of time.

An important goal of the time management philosophy is to conduct a multitude of tasks, at all levels, simultaneously. At the end of this study, two scenarios are provided to illustrate efficient operations. Appendix C illustrates effective time management in the combat trains and Appendix D illustrates a scenario for company operations.

Recommendations

In view of the findings of this study, the following recommendations are proposed:

(1) That doctrinal guidance include how to better manage time by providing specific techniques and procedures. The specific techniques and procedures presented in chapter 5 of this study should be considered for inclusion in principle Army doctrinal publications. Specifically, these techniques should be detailed in ST 100-9, FM 101-5,

FM 71-2, FM 71-1 and similar manuals which discuss the command and control process.

(2) That time management be considered a significant and separate issue when addressed in Army publications and all pertinent issues be consolidated in one area for reference.

(3) That the issue of time management receive more attention in the Army leadership schools as part of the curriculum, possibly as a separate block of instruction.

(4) That the Center for Army Lessons Learned publish a document similar to chapter 5 of this study to provide time management techniques and procedures to units and leaders in a consolidated format as an interim measure until published in FM 101-5 and other critical documents.

(5) That a CTC conduct a focused rotation to specifically analyze the issue of time management. Such a focused rotation will validate the findings of this research and determine, more specifically and with quantifiable observations, where time management is the problem and why. Once this determination is made, more precise solutions can be presented.

(6) That the techniques and procedures discussed in chapter 5 of this study may have applicability to units other than heavy battalion task forces and should be considered for their use.

Summary

This study demonstrated that time management is an area that requires improvement within task force operations. Leaders recognize that available doctrinal references offer incomplete information for such a critical aspect of the command and control process. Chapter five of this study offers many techniques and procedures which are intended to bridge the gap between the information that is needed and that which is currently available.

The true value of this study lies in the recommendations listed at the end of this chapter. These recommendations provide specific actions that can be taken to reduce the problem. Leaders will continue to be challenged to complete an ever increasing number of tasks while conducting tactical operations. These recommendations suggest tools to better equip and prepare leaders to meet this challenge.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

¹Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1988), 325.

²"Non-Mechanized Forces", Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, (Spring 1989), 14.

Chapter 2

¹Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1988), 325.

²Walter H. Gmelch, Beyond Stress to Effective Management (New York: Wiley, 1982), X.

³Jeffery L. Mayer, If You Haven't Got the Time to do it Right, When Will You Find the Time to do it Over? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 49.

⁴Kenneth Blanchard, The One Minute Manager Meets the Monkey (New York: Morrow, 1989), 97.

⁵Mayer, 91.

⁶Peter F. Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 25.

⁷Gmelch, 39.

⁸U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1986), 21.

⁹Ibid., 121. ¹⁰Ibid., 102. ¹¹Ibid., 143.

¹²Ibid., 22.

¹³U.S. Army, FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), 2-13.

¹⁴Ibid., 2-10.

¹⁵U.S. Army, FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), 2-23.

¹⁶General James H. Polk, Ret., "The Criticality of Time in Combat," Armor Magazine 97 (May-June 1988), 13.

¹⁷LTC John W. Wild, "Time Management Model" Infantry Magazine 77 (March-April 1987), 16.

¹⁸"Year of Training, Vol I: Heavy Forces", Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, (Fall 1988), 33.

¹⁹Ibid., 34. ²⁰Ibid.

²¹"NCO Lessons Learned", Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, (October 1989), 6.

Chapter 3

¹MG A. S. Newman, "Time and Timing: Both Critical in Combat," Army Magazine, 36 (May 1986), 67.

²Paul D. Leedy, Practical Research, Planning and Design (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 242-243.

Chapter 4

¹MG A. S. Newman, "Time and Timing: Both Critical in Combat," Army Magazine, 36 (May 1986), 67.

²Headquarters, National Training Center, "Take Home Package," Fort Irwin, California, a selection of six reports from rotation 92-1 through 92-6. These take home packages are controlled and their use for research, while encouraged, restricts the disclosure of the identity of the training units and the exact dates the training occurred. While use of data is encouraged to further disseminate lessons learned, the identity of the training units is specifically protected and prohibited.

³Ibid. ⁴Ibid. ⁵Ibid. ⁶Ibid. ⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid. ⁹Ibid. ¹⁰Ibid. ¹¹Ibid. ¹²Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid. ¹⁶Ibid. ¹⁷Ibid. ¹⁸Ibid. ¹⁹Ibid. ²⁰Ibid.
²¹Ibid. ²²Ibid. ²³Ibid. ²⁴Ibid. ²⁵Ibid. ²⁶Ibid.
²⁷Ibid. ²⁸Ibid. ²⁹Ibid. ³⁰Ibid. ³¹Ibid. ³²Ibid.
³³Ibid. ³⁴Ibid. ³⁵Ibid. ³⁶Ibid. ³⁷Ibid. ³⁸Ibid.
³⁹Ibid. ⁴⁰Ibid. ⁴¹Ibid. ⁴²Ibid. ⁴³Ibid. ⁴⁴Ibid.
⁴⁵Ibid. ⁴⁶Ibid. ⁴⁷Ibid. ⁴⁸Ibid. ⁴⁹Ibid. ⁵⁰Ibid.
⁵¹Ibid. ⁵²Ibid. ⁵³Ibid. ⁵⁴Ibid. ⁵⁵Ibid.

Chapter 5

¹CPT Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., "Maneuvering in Time," Marine Corps Gazette, 75 (February 1991), 75.

²U.S. Army, FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), B-3.

³U.S. Army, FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), 2-6.

⁴COL William F. Daugherty, "Commander's Intent", ATZL-SWT-C Memorandum for Record, 14 September 1990, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁵Ibid.

⁶FM 71-2, 3-4.

⁷Ibid., 2-14.

⁸CAPT Kenneth F. McKenzie, "Maneuvering in Time" Marine Corps Gazette 75 (February 1991), 77.

⁹"Rehearsals", Center For Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 91-1 (April 1991).

¹⁰LTC John W. Wild, "Time Management Model" Infantry Magazine 77 (March-April 1987), 14-16.

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

focused rotation	A training rotation conducted at a Combat Training Center (the NTC, for the purposes of this study) which, in addition to all the usual feedback and observations collected and analyzed, specifically seeks information directed at an area of interest.
take home package	A package of information, statistics and data, with analysis, pertaining to a specific unit and its conduct of a series of training missions at a Combat Training Center. This series of missions constitutes the rotation. The intent of the take home package is to provide definitive feedback, in a permanent medium, to allow a unit ready access to data acquired at the training center which may be useful in planning home station training.
Task Force	A temporary or semipermanent organization of units under one commander to carry out a continuing specific task or series of missions. For the purposes of this study, a battalion sized unit of the combat arms consisting of a battalion control headquarters with at least one of its major subordinate elements (a company), and the attachment of at least one company-sized element of another combat arm.
time management	The application of all time available to a leader. The time available begins when the higher headquarters issues the warning order and ends at the mission's scheduled start time.

APPENDIX B

THE DATA

In this appendix, the results of the research are presented. This data represents the reduction of the findings, analysis and recommendations by the OCs for the six battalion task force rotations used for this study. The specific time management information was extracted and collated for analysis and comparison.

The data presented here is in its pure form. There has been no analysis or discussion. It has been merely extracted from the take home packages. For this reason, it has been placed in this appendix instead of the main text of this study. The data was collated to present a more usable format for analysis. This helped to facilitate the discussion that occurs in chapters four and five.

The NTC take home packages used for the data base in this study are controlled and their use for research, while encouraged, restricts the disclosure of the identity of the training units and the exact dates the training occurred. While the use of the data is encouraged to further disseminate lessons learned, the identity of the training units is specifically protected and prohibited.

The data are presented in the same format used throughout the rest of this study. Except for the information presented in the matrices, all data is quoted directly from the take home packages.

TASK FORCE ONE

SECTION I

Table 3.--OC Identified Deficiencies, TF#1 (By Mission)

UNIT PARAMETER	TM A	TM B	TM C	TM D	E CO	CTCP	TOC
ADHERE TO TIME LINE	ALL	1,2,3 6,7	1,5, 6,7	2,4, 6,7	4		1,2,4
1/3 - 2/3 RULE	4	1,3	5	4,6, 7,8			
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE							
STAFF TRAINING							
DELEGATE TASKS							
COMMANDER INTENT			1		6		
FIX RESPONSIBILITY					4		
ANTICIPATE					3		
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT		1,3, 4,5	2,6	1,2, 4,6	2		1
PRIORITIZE WORK	1,2, 5,7	3,4,6	5	4	4		
USE OF SOPs	6					5	ALL
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)	1,3, 4,6	6	1,2,4 6,7	1,2, 7,8	1,2,3 4,5,6		1,2
CONDUCT PCC/PCI	4,5,8	1,3	2,5	1,2, 6,7	2,6	4,5	
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD	1,4	1,3	1				

Mission 1: Defend

Mission 2: Deliberate Attack

Mission 3: Deliberate Attack

Mission 4: Defend in Sector

Mission 5: Movement to Contact

Mission 6: Hasty Attack

Mission 7: Defend in Sector

Section II: LESSONS LEARNED (TIME MANAGEMENT ISSUES)

A. Company Operations:

- The commander must incorporate Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) with a realistic time line using backwards planning.
- TLP and the orders process were avoided.
- Adherence to the TLP and the supervision of prioritized tasks will result in successful mission accomplishment.
- A leader's recon is invaluable to the success of a mission.
- PCIs must be accomplished to standard. Failure to inspect soldiers and equipment does not ensure the unit is totally prepared to execute its mission.
- Do not hesitate to plan, even if the concept of operation from higher headquarters is incomplete. Missions can be deduced from the situation, they need not be derived solely from specified tasks.
- Use preparation time efficiently by conducting the TLP steps concurrently and task subordinate leaders with recon responsibility.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- A system for the submission of routine reports from subordinate units and attachments needs to be further developed within the battalion.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- The TOC was not set up and ready to operate at critical points in the battle.
- The TF plan was not rehearsed nor was a backbrief conducted. The plan was not practiced at the TF level.

SECTION III: OC OBSERVATIONS PERTAINING TO TIME MANAGEMENT

A. Company Operations:

- Misuse of time available was the commander's greatest problem.
- The unit did not follow the TLP.
- The ever changing information and guidance also did not allow for the time to be available for a company commander to solely focus on preparing for combat.
- Time management was nonexistent.
- The commander failed to establish the backward planning process.
- Although the company had sufficient time, they did not issue a movement order or conduct a recon.

- Although the TLP were followed, a time line would help synchronize and organize the prep.
- The only major shortcoming was the lack of a time line to organize platoon leaders and tank commanders' time.
- The company commander does not understand the TLP.
- The commander failed to backwards plan the use of available time and critical preparatory tasks were not accomplished.
- The company does not effectively utilize their time.
- Not following the TLP or adhering to a published time line hindered the prep.
- The ability to manage time has not improved and has hindered prep.
- Lack of meaningful company rehearsals continued to detract from the unit's ability to execute.
- Despite the time to conduct rehearsals, none were conducted.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- No Combat Service Support (CSS) rehearsals were conducted.
- The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) was not involved in the planning process and the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) personnel were not briefed on the current operation.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- The TOC and staff were not prepared to plan. They had not planned for a planning process. They did not establish a time line or make any sequential plan for developing an order.
- The staff failed to produce any decision support products despite ample opportunity and time.
- The TF used almost 60% of the available time.
- The time management system followed by the TF did not work effectively.
- The use of a time line would greatly help the TF in overcoming their significant deficiency in planning.
- The TF needed to develop a training program of back up personnel in the TOC in order to achieve depth in the planning so that time is not lost with the absence of key primary planners, for any reason.
- Throughout the exercise, prep time was squandered and rehearsals ineffective.
- It is recommended that the TOC develop an SOP.

TASK FORCE TWO

SECTION I

Table 4.--OC Identified Deficiencies, TF #2 (By Mission)

UNIT PARAMETER	TM A	TM B	TM C	TM F	CTCP	TOC
ADHERE TO TIME LINE		4,5,6	3			1
1/3 - 2/3 RULE	7	6				
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE	1	1,6	1	1		
STAFF TRAINING	8			2		
DELEGATE TASKS						
COMMANDER INTENT			3			
FIX RESPONSIBILITY						
ANTICIPATE						
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT	3,5,7	4,6	4			
PRIORITIZE WORK		1		1		
USE OF SOPs	3,5	3	3		5	1
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)	3,4,8	1,3,8	2,3,4 5,7,8	2,3	5	1,2,6
CONDUCT PCC/PCI	3,5,6 7,8	3,7	3,5,6 7,8	3		
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD	8	1,2,3 4,8		3	2	

Mission 1: Zone Recon
Mission 2: Delay
Mission 3: Hasty Attack
Mission 4: Defend

Mission 5: Counter Attack
Mission 6: Movement to Contact
Mission 7: Hasty Attack
Mission 8: Flank Guard

Section II: LESSONS LEARNED (Time Management Issues)

A. Company Operations:

- Observe the 1/3 - 2/3 rule to allow subordinates maximum time to prepare for a mission.
- Rehearsals are critical to mission success.
- Time lining critical tasks is key to ensuring all tasks are completed.
- The company leadership should follow and enforce the TLP. In particular, they have to supervise properly to ensure prep for the mission are accomplished.
- Supervision of tasks and PCC/PCIs must be done by the commander and subordinate leaders.
- Develop and enforce priority of work for occupation of assembly areas and defensive positions. There should be a reverse time schedule prepared for every mission.
- Backbriefing subordinates is an effective technique to ensure they understand your intent and concept.
- Many types of offensive rehearsals could have been conducted between 0700 hours and 1600 hours, even if the exact mission was unclear.
- Plan for success and total failure. Chances are, you will be between, but at least you will have an idea what to do next.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- Operations orders need to be issued to all units within the BN, to include Combat Trains, UMCP, MED PLT and Field Trains.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- The plan was not the result of an organized, time lined planning effort. It consumed far more of the subordinate's time than necessary.
- To be successful, the maneuver plan must be understood and rehearsed by all key parties.

SECTION III: OC OBSERVATIONS PERTAINING TO TIME MANAGEMENT

A. Company Operations:

- Essentially, the commander did not follow the TLP. Not enough thought was given to priority of work and time management.
- Leaders at all levels need to ensure preparations for a mission are properly accomplished.
- Priority of work and time management were not thought through and enforced.
- The 1/3 - 2/3 rule was not observed.
- There was no reverse time schedule for the company to follow.
- A time line was not issued with the order.

- Simply manage time more efficiently to allow for rehearsals to be conducted.
- PCC/PCIs were not conducted to standard, even though there was time to do the checks.
- A rapid rehearsal was conducted after stand-to. It included only platoon leaders, FIST and the commander. Consider putting the entire company on the company radio net to listen.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- A CSS rehearsal was conducted late in the preparation phase. This provided inadequate time for the development of adequate CSS plans at company level.
- The CTCP did not conduct a rehearsal or briefing for this operation.
- Coordination between the CSS planners was inadequate, and resulted in a service support plan which did not support the scheme of maneuver.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- Counting the company commanders' travel time to and from each meeting, the BN wasted a lot of subordinate's time.
- The BN rehearsal was a wargaming session and was ineffective.
- No rehearsal was conducted of the maneuver plan, and only two commanders were able to backbrief the BN commander.
- Planning guidance was not given to the staff and what guidance did occur was late, not allowing for consideration of additional courses of action.

TASK FORCE THREE

SECTION II

Table 5.--OC Identified Deficiencies, TF#3 (By Mission)

UNIT PARAMETER	TM A	TM B	TM C	TM D	E CO	CTCP	TOC
ADHERE TO TIME LINE	1,4,7	2,3,4 7,8	1,2,3 4,5,6	1,2,3 4,5	7,8		
1/3 - 2/3 RULE			7	3,8	7		
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE					1		2
STAFF TRAINING				2	3		
DELEGATE TASKS							
COMMANDER INTENT		7		4			
FIX RESPONSIBILITY		7					
ANTICIPATE							
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT	3,7,8	2,3,4 7	8		7		
PRIORITIZE WORK		3,4,8			2,3,4 5		
USE OF SOPs	1,4	7	5		2		
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)	1,2,3 5,8	3,4,5 6,7,8	1,2,4 5,6	1,2,3 5,6	2,3,4 5,8		2
CONDUCT PCC/PCI	5,7,8	3,7,8	8	7	1,2,3 4		
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD			2,3,5				

Mission 1: Attack

Mission 2: Deliberate Attack

Mission 3: Hasty Attack

Mission 4: Deliberate Attack

Mission 5: Deliberate Attack

Mission 6: Defend

Mission 7: Defend

Mission 8: Movement to Contact

SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED (TIME MANAGEMENT ISSUES)

A. Company Operations:

- Do not waste plan/prep time. The commander needs to seek all available information. The Commander needs to establish a time line for priorities of work and execute.
- Trust is not a substitute for supervision. Professionals are not insulted when leaders check for compliance of orders or intent.
- All leaders and soldiers must be trained in the unit SOP for it to be effective.
- An in-depth rehearsal would have shown that the area was critical and required more graphic control measures.
- Time management needs to be prioritized, delegated and checked.
- The team must rehearse.
- Understand the commander's intent. In the absence of orders, execute.
- Companies must conduct company level rehearsals.
- Recon tasks developed in advance must be assigned to subordinate leaders to maximize the use of time and assist in the decision making process.
- Nearly 8 hours was wasted in a failure of the unit to rehearse after being ordered to be the breach force. The breach could have been rehearsed during periods of limited visibility.
- The team's preparation for the defense was inefficient. Range cards were incomplete, poor dispersion of fighting positions and inadequate adjacent unit coordination occurred. They failed to prepare the entire time.
- Good PCIs are critical to ensure that CL III and CL V are available in sufficient quantity for success in battle.
- Time management is the key. In the absence of the commander, critical tasks must be conducted.
- Time management continues to be a major concern for this unit. This results in compressed planning and preparation for the platoons and squads.
- Time management continues to hurt this unit. The orders process must allow for sufficient prep time for a unit to prepare for battle. Boresighting and rehearsals must be conducted to standard for a unit to be successful in battle.
- The company must control their engineer assets more carefully. A maneuver unit cannot afford to waste valuable blade time while constructing their defense.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- CSS functions are anticipative in nature and are performed as far forward as the tactical situation will allow.
- The CTCP, under the supervision of the S-4, anticipates, requests, coordinates and supervises execution of CSS.
- The CSS plan must be clear and simple. The CSS annex and CSS overlay must include all pertinent information to ensure the success of the CSS plan. It must support the tactical plan.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- The TOC staff must track the defensive prep and ensure the critical tasks are completed and reported to brigade.
- A detailed mission and time analysis helps to design a plan that is flexible enough to react to most situations.
- A rehearsal is essential to ensure understanding of the plan and validate decision support criteria.
- The TOC's battle staff must track the offensive preparation efforts to ensure critical tasks are completed and reported to the brigade.

SECTION III: OC OBSERVATIONS PERTAINING TO TIME MANAGEMENT

A. Company Operations:

- A time line was never established to accomplish critical tasks, hence alternate and supplemental positions were never identified, reconned or rehearsed.
- No time line or priorities of work were established.
- No time analysis was conducted. No time line or priorities of work were established.
- The commander and FSO wasted valuable planning and prep time by not actively seeking information from higher headquarters.
- After the company OPORD, no rehearsal or backbrief was conducted.
- There was no time management, no control of time.
- There was a lack of supervision at all levels.
- The team never identified critical tasks, assigned responsibilities or supervised the conduct of the prep.
- The commander never appreciated the need to supervise the critical tasks associated with the conduct of the defense.
- The 1/3 - 2/3 rule was not to standard and a time line was nonexistent.
- Lack of rehearsal and recon made movement shoddy.

- The team did not adequately prepare for this mission. The commander delegated priorities of work to his subordinates prior to his departure to the TF order and rehearsal; however, the inexperienced junior leadership did not follow through.
- PCIs were neither planned nor conducted.
- Time limitations severely limited the preparation.
- An OPORD, no matter how simple, needs to be issued.
- During the WARNORD, a time line needs to be developed and published.
- Supervision by the unit's leadership was very limited.
- Nothing was done in the commander's absence.
- Poor time management continues to hinder the company's ability to adequately prepare for a mission. The orders process occurs so late that rehearsals are virtually impossible.
- The time line was inadequate.
- Leader supervision was marginal.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- No rehearsal or backbrief was conducted within the CTCP; no TF CSS rehearsal was conducted due to time constraints. The CTCP personnel were briefed on the mission just prior to movement.
- No PCIs were conducted.
- Several ammo shortages occurred within the TF as a result of inaccurate status reports and the CTCPs failure to push ammo forward prior to the battle.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- Time analysis was conducted and a time line of critical tasks was developed, but not distributed to unit commanders and staff members.
- No time line was posted to assist the TOC operation's section in tracking critical tasks. This lack of effort to manage critical tasks hindered the TF's prep.
- The commander and staff did not go forward on the battlefield to supervise and inspect the preparation efforts of subordinate units.
- A time line was developed, but not used.
- The lack of a formal orders process resulted in no guidance from the commander in a timely manner to complete COA development and war gaming.
- Staff supervision during the prep phase was not accomplished. This was a result of not having a defined time line published to units and not tracked by the staff.

TASK FORCE FOUR

SECTION I

Table 6.--OC Identified Deficiencies, TF#4 (By Mission)

UNIT PARAMETER	TM A	TM B	TM C	TM D	CTCP	TOC
ADHERE TO TIME LINE		1,3, 6,7	6,7			
1/3 - 2/3 RULE		6,7	6,7			1
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE						2,3
STAFF TRAINING						
DELEGATE TASKS						
COMMANDER INTENT		2,3,5				
FIX RESPONSIBILITY						
ANTICIPATE						
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT	6,7	1,2	2,4,6	2,7		
PRIORITIZE WORK		2,6,7	6,7	3,4		
USE OF SOPs	2		7	1,3,5		1,2
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)	3,4	1,3,4 6,7	2,6,7	2,3,4		1
CONDUCT PCC/PCI	3,6,7	1,2,3 7	2,6,7	1,2,3 4,5,7	1,2,3 4	
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD		3				

Mission 1: Movement to Contact (MTC) Mission 5: Night Attack
 Mission 2: Deliberate Attack Mission 6: MTC
 Mission 3: Hasty Defense Mission 7: Hasty Attack
 Mission 4: Defend in Sector

SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED (Time Management Issues)

A. Company Operations:

- The quality of the operation was severely affected by a lack of a leader's sleep plan. Leaders must use reverse planning to form a sleep plan, and enforce it.
- Leaders must supervise and inspect their elements.
- Practice/rehearse the tactical plan sufficiently.
- The commander's intent must be clear.
- Leaders must supervise and inspect their soldiers during the prep phase of a mission.
- No rest plan was established, resulting in soldiers being active for almost a full day prior to crossing the LD to attack.
- The ability to develop plans and orders without much available time can be accomplished if TLPs are understood and exercised.
- Little to nothing occurred during preparation.
A specific problem was time management and a failure to identify specific tasks leaders and soldiers should have accomplished.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- All CSS planners need to integrate into the TF decision making process. The planning sequence should be refined to take into account a compressed time schedule.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- The TF staff did not take advantage of available time to further refine the plan and develop decision support products.
- The staff must plan for a planning session.
- The XO must supervise the staff and manage available planning time.

SECTION III: OC OBSERVATIONS PERTAINING TO TIME MANAGEMENT

A. Company Operations:

- The commander directed that certain tasks or events would be done at certain times, but he did not develop a reverse time schedule to manage time available.
- The commander's intent was not clear.
- The priority of work for the engagement area was not clear.
- The commander did not prepare a reverse planning schedule to manage available time.
- No rest plan was established, resulting in troops being active for almost a full day prior to the attack.

- An adequate time line and priorities of work were not developed.
- Rehearsals were not conducted, time allotted was not effectively used.
- Leaders could have been more involved in inspections.
- A backwards time line may have helped platoon leaders with priorities.
- The 1/3 - 2/3 rule was not followed. 2/3 of the time was used for planning at the company level. Platoon orders were issued, but not effective due to a lack of available time.
- No time line was published upon receipt of the TF warning order.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- 15 minutes after the TOC was destroyed by the enemy, the CTCP picked up the fight. The CTCP was unable to function effectively as the TOC. It did not have current maneuver graphics, intelligence overlays, or engineer overlays. The CTCP did not know the TF's combat power status, nor the friendly or enemy locations. They did not establish communications with any brigade elements.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- Time management became a problem as the brigade and task force took too much time for rehearsals that were ineffective and did not allow time for subordinate commanders to properly prepare and rehearse.
- Brigade consumed much of the time available with several meetings and changes.
- Much of the prep time was used at battalion and brigade rehearsals as well as in deceptive repositioning.
- The TF must develop a system for management and link up of engineer digging assets to prevent wasting time.
- The staff had ample time to further develop and refine the plan, but did not take advantage of the available time to fully develop the plan. Consequently, the plan lacked sufficient detail for each phase to be effectively executed.
- The task force used over 50% of the available planning time.
- The TOC did not effectively track the TF's prep for the defense. The TF lost control of its digging assets.

TASK FORCE FIVE

SECTION I

Table 7.--OC Identified Deficiencies, TF#5 (By Mission)

UNIT PARAMETER	TM A	TM B	TM C	TM D	E CO	CTCP	TOC
ADHERE TO TIME LINE	5	5	5	1,2,5	1		
1/3 - 2/3 RULE	5	5	6				
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE				7			
STAFF TRAINING				7			
DELEGATE TASKS							
COMMANDER INTENT							2
FIX RESPONSIBILITY							
ANTICIPATE				7			
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT		5,6	4,6	2,4			2
PRIORITIZE WORK	5	5		2,5			3
USE OF SOPs		7	1,6	7			1
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)	6,7	2,3, 5,6	6	4	1,4	2,3	1,3,4
CONDUCT PCC/PCI		5	4,6	1,2,5			
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD	5	1,2					

Mission 1: Movement to Contact Mission 5: Defend
 Mission 2: Defend in Sector Mission 6: Attack
 Mission 3: Deliberate Attack Mission 7: Move to Contact
 Mission 4: Night Attack

SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED (Time Management Issues)

A. Company Operations:

- Use all available time. Recon, rehearse, and mark routes from TAA to LDs
- Rehearsals are imperative in refining the plan and overcoming unforeseen problems during execution.
- In planning, insure a detailed, five-paragraph OPORD is issued so everyone understands the mission and the commander's intent.
- Establish priorities of work, and check them.
- In the absence of adequate planning time, rehearsals will solidify whatever plan is made and will also paint a picture in the subordinate leader's minds of how you want the plan executed. From this picture, FRAGOs can be issued.
- A company with a counter reconnaissance mission must devote a great deal of time and effort to planning and preparing its actual defensive positions. The unit must find time to rehearse to succeed.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

No Time Management Lessons Learned were listed for this rotation.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- When time is short, actions must happen quickly. There is no substitute for a plan that describes the specific task/purpose of the main effort, the task and purpose of the CO/TMs, special platoons, and the other combat multipliers which will influence or support the success of the main effort. This mission order must be supported by adequate graphics, to include a concept for counter-recon repositioning and use of the reserve. When everyone understands the results each subordinate must achieve (task) and what their unique contribution is (the why), it provides a common base that either can be executed as planned or rapidly adapted to meet a changing situation. During the execution, if the intent (what must be done) is understood, graphics are adequate, and lateral commo exists within the TF, then subordinates can use their initiative to achieve the "how" to complete the mission. When this is not done, subordinates usually receive FRAGOs sending them in different directions so there is rarely a coordinated effort among the units in the fight.
- Obstacle and material tracking is crucial to success. A plan must be in place to accomplish this. A time line would be helpful.

- TLP must be used concurrently at all levels.
- If rehearsals are not SOP, they are doomed to failure. They are worse than no rehearsals at all because they waste valuable time.

SECTION III: OC OBSERVATIONS PERTAINING TO TIME MANAGEMENT

A. Company Operations:

- Time analysis was poor. The commander did not backwards plan or establish a tentative plan.
- The 1/3- 2/3 rule was not effective and there was no time line.
- The commander did not issue a detailed, 5 paragraph OPORD, although there was time available.
- Platoon OPORDs were very ineffective due to a lack of planning time and the late hour they were briefed.
- The company OPORD lacked detail necessary for subordinates to effectively plan and execute the company plan. They did not discuss priority of engineer effort within the company, and they did not time line available time or establish suspenses for critical tasks.
- No company rehearsals were conducted due to a lack of time.
- Company rehearsals were not conducted although time was available. This omission later had a significant effect on the unit's ability to perform its assigned mission.
- The commander needed to stick to his time line.
- Soldiers were not prepared for combat. The only items inspected from the company SOP for PCIs were weapons. Dismounts did not have enough CL V and were not in the correct uniform. Rehearsals that were directed to be done in the commander's order were never done. Leaders did not inspect or supervise.
- Since detailed mission analysis was not conducted during planning, prep was hindered by "quick fix" additions and changes to the original plan.
- A time line was used, but time was not used to the commander's best advantage.
- Time analysis was used only until issuance of the order. It was not used to guide the preparation.
- Adequate prep time was allocated for the mission, but platoons still did not conduct rehearsals to standard. Also, adjacent unit coordination was not accomplished despite the availability of time.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- The CSS staff conducted a rehearsal. Not all subunits were present and it was actually a briefing of the plan, not a rehearsal.
- The rehearsal is briefing oriented and not focused on subunits understanding of the plan.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- Time management is inadequate. The TF does not understand the use of warning orders.
- The task force engineers built an excellent terrain model of the enemy positions and obstacles on the objective. A rehearsal was scheduled, but not conducted, because of poor time management.
- Time management continued to impact on the subordinate's ability to parallel plan and conduct effective TLP.
- The TF prep still remained inadequate. The TF OPORD was issued late. With the use of any initiative on the part of the S-3, the planning process would have started the night before. Nothing in this task force starts on time. The time line, when developed, was not approved by the commander and it was never updated based on METT-T.
- The TOC did not execute its movement as planned because soldiers were still sleeping in their sleeping bags.
- The time line developed during the mission analysis inadequately focused the prep. Full use of the prep time available did not occur.
- The TF conducted a mounted rehearsal of a plan the BDE told the TF they would not execute, and a rock drill of a plan they would execute.

TASK FORCE SIX

SECTION I

Table 8.--OC Identified Deficiencies, TF#6 (By Mission)

UNIT PARAMETER	TM A	TM B	TM C	CSC	CTCP	TOC
ADHERE TO TIME LINE	6,7	1,2,7	1,2,3	3,6,7		3,7
1/3 - 2/3 RULE			2	3		
HIGHER HQ INTERFERENCE		3,5		6		
STAFF TRAINING					6	
DELEGATE TASKS						
COMMANDER INTENT	5					
FIX RESPONSIBILITY						
ANTICIPATE					1	
SUPERVISE/ INSPECT		1,2, 3,7	1,7	4		3,6
PRIORITIZE WORK	3,6,7	1,2, 5,7	1,2,3	1,3,7		3
USE OF SOPs						
REHEARSAL (NONE/ INADEQ)	2,5,6	6,7	6,7,	1	1,2,6	1,6
CONDUCT PCC/PCI		7	1	4	1	1
NO/ INCOMPLETE OPORD				1,2,4 5		

Mission 1: Movement to contact
Mission 2: Deliberate Attack
Mission 3: Delay
Mission 4: Movement to Contact

Mission 5: Delay, Defend
Mission 6: Hasty Attack
Mission 7: Defend

SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED (Time Management Issues)

A. Company Operations:

- Time management and prioritization of tasks are critical components of success. There are many tasks to be accomplished and too little time. The commander must prioritize to ensure the most critical tasks are accomplished.
- Understand the commander's intent, at all levels.
- If bull dozers are available for defensive preparation, care must be taken to ensure they are properly used. A CINC dozer is recommended to ensure time is not wasted.
- Prioritize the events you need to rehearse.
- When time is short, prioritize the tasks that must be completed to successfully complete the mission. Even though you may not complete all of the tasks, those most important to your success will be accomplished.
- The entire prep time must be tightly managed through the use of detailed, centralized planning and decentralized execution. There is never enough time to do everything, so tasks must be prioritized and executed to accomplish as much as possible.
- Conduct rehearsals with leadership.
- Establish priorities of work and hold subordinate leaders accountable.
- Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse.
- The commander must refine his TLP so the planning process is refined at the company level.
- Time analysis must be an integral part of mission analysis and must be conducted continuously until the mission is accomplished.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

No time management lessons learned are listed for this rotation.

C. Tactical Operations Center:

- Formal PCI is essential. Load plans and tie down weapons and hatches.
- Time management is critical in the defense to ensure that slice elements are attached to their supported units in sufficient time to prepare their positions.

SECTION III: OC OBSERVATIONS PERTAINING TO TIME MANAGEMENT

A. Company Operations:

- Platoon OPORDs were not given due to poor time management. The company commander and platoon leaders must learn to plan and allocate their subordinate's time more effectively. The lack of platoon OPORDs was critical to mission accomplishment.
- Once again, time management and lack of prioritization of tasks to be accomplished were lacking.
- Battalion must allocate enough time to allow platoons to adequately prepare for combat. Platoons consistently receive OPORDs in the dark and rehearse in the dark.
- No clear priorities were established by the commander.
- The commander's time was seriously hampered by the battalion's late order and continuous changes; however, the company commander did not fully address all work needed to be done when issuing his priorities of work.
- The company could have made better use of its prep time, even if it was dark.
- Leaders did not dictate to subordinates any priority of work.

B. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP):

- The current CTCP setup is simply not functional. When the S-4 became a casualty, the CTCP became totally unfunctional.

C. Tactical Operations Center (TOC):

- The TF prep needed more emphasis. Time management continued to be a problem. The OPORD was issued late and daylight was subsequently wasted for rehearsals at company level.
- The TF prep for the delay was inadequate. Time management continues to be poor. The OPORD lacks detail and was issued late. Subsequently, the engineer effort lost valuable time.
- Key leaders do not supervise and inspect the preparation of the delay.
- Although the OPORD presentation improved, time management was still inadequate. The OPORD prep tasks were not directed, suspended or supervised.
- The BN main CP does not manage or track the preparation. Without a time line to focus the BN's prep effort, the mortar platoon had no ammo as the BN crossed the LD.
- Without a time line posted in the main CP, the TOC personnel did not know when events must occur or which events to track.
- The 16 hours of prep time was not analyzed or managed

APPENDIX C
EFFECTIVE TIME MANAGEMENT IN THE COMBAT TRAINS

Using the Troop Leading Procedures as a framework, the following matrix shows a simplified example of the activities that occur in the task force TOC, and what should occur in the combat trains command post (CTCP) and the combat trains. The intent is to maximize the use of the time management techniques and procedures discussed previously. Most importantly, a multitude of tasks is conducted, at all echelons, simultaneously.

The principle reason this matrix differs from implementing the TLPs in customary fashion is the use of multiple warning orders. The CTCP is able to get inside the TLP cycle of the TOC. The CTCP does not wait for the TOC to accomplish step seven of the TLP, issue the order, before beginning to accomplish significant tasks. The CTCP uses available information to begin activities much earlier in the process, resulting in more efficient use of time.

Table 9.--Time Management Matrix for the Combat Trains

<u>TLP</u>	<u>TF CMD (TOC) ACTIONS</u>	<u>CSS ACTIONS (CBT TNS)</u>
(1) Receive the Mission	-situation update (FM)	-continue BDA, CASEVAC and recovery operations
(2) Issue Warning Order	-Issue WARNORD #1 -Mission statement -General instructions -Special instructions -Changes to Task Org -Initial time line	-Disseminate WARNORD #1 -Continue support activities -Finalize unit status reports (Pers, Maint, Equip, CASEVAC) -Prepare forecasts/estimates -Mission analysis
-WARNORD #2	-Issue WARNORD #2 -Changes or updates to MSN statement, general or special instructions -Revised time line -Prepare for planning	-Disseminate WARNORD #2 -Planning staff moves to TOC (S1, S4, BMO, MED PLT LDR) -Receive CDR's guidance -Special requests to higher HQ -Consistent with METT-T, consolidate CBT TNS / UMCP / medical assets
(3) Make a Tentative Plan	-Course of action development -Wargame / select COA	-Continue CSS activities -Conduct PCIs -Refuel, refit, rearm
(4) Initiate Movement	-Issue WARNORD #3 -Initiate movement as necessary	-Disseminate WARNORD #3 -FRAGO from S-1 at TOC sends new locations to S4 NCOIC -CBT TNS/UMCP prepare to move -Dispatch quartering party -Relocate CBT TNS / UMCP -Continue PCI
(5) Recon	-Initiate/continue reconnaissance	-Route and site recons for new locations, decon sites
(6) Complete the Plan	-Order preparation	-S1, MED OFF and BMO return to new location with plan, brief key leaders -Coordinate forward assets (AXPs, MCPs, decon)
(7) Issue the Order	-Briefback -Rehearsal	-Dispatch forward assets -Attend LOGPAC
(8) Supervise and Refine the Plan	-Continuous supervision and refinement	-S4 returns to CBT TNS, issues OPORD/Briefback/rehearsals -Continue to manage classes of supply, sustainment and replacement operations

CTCP Time Management: A Scenario

The task force has been involved in continuous operations for several days. The brigade has just issued a warning order. The TF receives a change of mission and will transition from the attack and prepare to defend from the positions it now occupies. The unit needs to be prepared to defend against an enemy counterattack expected in 18-24 hours. The TF TOC issues warning order #1.

Upon receipt of the TF warning order, the S-4 disseminates the warning order to his subordinates. This warning order includes the mission statement, general and special instructions, and a time line. This warning order is sent via FM over the admin/log net.

Within 30 minutes of receipt of the TF warning order, the combat trains staff finalizes the combat status from the forward companies, separate platoons and field trains CP, collates and provides this information, via FM, to the TOC. Included in this situation update are all CSS limitations, internal and external, that may impact upon mission execution. Internal limitations may include a shortage of recovery assets in the maintenance platoon due to maintenance problems, while external limitations may include a reduced backhaul capability from the supporting medical company due to enemy activity.

Execution of CSS activities for the present mission is placed in the hands of the capable second tier, the S-4

section NCOIC, the medical platoon sergeant, and the senior mechanic of the UMCP. Casualty evacuation and recovery operations continue and the emergency CL V requested by a forward company is promptly dispatched. The unit CSS reports continue to be sent to the CTCP, are collated, recorded and processed. The focus of the primary CSS leaders becomes planning for the next mission.

The TOC issues warning order #2. Per unit SOP, the S-4 disseminates warning order #2 to his subordinates and provides specific instructions to his NCOIC. He verifies that the support platoon leader in the field trains has been notified of any changes in the task organization that might effect the configuration of the LOGPAC. He also checks to see that the field trains is activating the appropriate annex of the SOP that tailors packages of Class V for the purpose of mines and prestocks for the defense. With an updated unit status and estimates, the S-4, S-1, BMO and medical platoon leader report to the TOC for the planning process.

While the primary CSS planners are absent from the combat trains, there is no break in the activities conducted at the CTCP. Casualty evacuation and vehicle recovery continue. Reports continue to be processed and the unit status continues to be refined and verified.

The CSS planners are at the TOC for the development of the task force plan. They continue to advise the

commander and other staff members of any CSS limitations to the courses of action being considered. The commander selects a course of action. The CSS plan to support that course of action is prepared.

The S-4 confirms the site selection for the combat trains primary and subsequent positions with the S-3, and selects the main supply route (MSR) and two alternate supply routes (ASRs). Several potential decontamination sites are identified.

Based upon METT-T analysis, the medical platoon leader determines that the most efficient casualty evacuation technique will be using the split-aid configuration, with the treatment teams positioned well forward. An additional ambulance is attached to the company designated as the main effort.

The BMO expands the maintenance time lines, permitting more vehicles to be "fixed forward". For example, those organizational or direct support maintenance jobs requiring up to six hours to repair will be repaired in the company trains and those requiring 6-24 hours will be recovered to the UMCP. These times are based upon the task force mission. This adjustment to the evacuation criteria will provide more combat power to the task force by the defend NLT time.

The S-1 verifies the commander's guidance for priority of personnel replacement if it differs from the SOP. The plan is complete.

The TOC issues warning order #3. The S-1 calls the CTCP to verify their receipt of warning order #3 and instructs the S-4 NCOIC to dispatch the quartering party to the new combat trains location. Per SOP, the S-4 NCOIC directs the consolidation of all combat trains and UMCP assets and orders them to prepare to move. They continue to refit, refuel, resupply and conduct PCIs preparing for the new mission.

Prior to departing the TOC, the S-1, BMO and medical platoon leader secure copies of the CSS graphics and execution matrix. The S-1 returns to the CTCP. The medical platoon leader and the BMO return to the aid station and UMCP, respectively, and brief their subordinates on the plan for the next mission. All assets prepare to move to the new location as the quartering party calls verifying its adequacy and security.

The S-4 remains at the TOC providing CSS expertise and supervising the reproduction of the CSS graphics and matrix. He briefs the CSS plan at the TF operations order.

The CSS assets are moved to their new position. As the CSS plan called for a split-aid configuration of the battalion aid station, these assets are emplaced accordingly, positioned well forward to reduce casualty

evacuation time. Recovery assets and ambulances are placed forward in the selected positions to facilitate prompt evacuation of wounded soldiers and recovery of NMC vehicles. Collocation of forward recovery and evacuation assets enhances security. Early emplacement also facilitates daylight route reconnaissance of the medical and maintenance teams from the company positions to the UMCP and forward treatment teams.

Upon completion of the task force operations order, the S-4 returns to the new CTCP location. He briefs the combat trains personnel on any changes and ensures subordinates understand the plan. Graphics and matrices are disseminated. He assigns tasks and ensures all personnel understand the priorities of work and the time line. Per SOP, The time line and the progress of key events are posted and tracked in the CTCP. The S-4 posts all graphics to the CP map. Appreciating the importance of the CTCP's mission to perform the functions of the TOC if the TOC is destroyed, he verifies that he has all graphics and a complete copy of the TF and brigade operations orders. He conducts a communications check with the brigade tactical and main CPs, and the DS FA battalion.

Per SOP, the S-1 meets at the LRP with all first sergeants and specialty platoon sergeants 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the LOGPAC. A rehearsal of the CSS plan is conducted to ensure that all CSS executors understand the

plan and possess the associated graphics and matrix.

Routine CSS coordination is performed.

The CSS philosophy of this unit emphasizes planning. It recognizes that planning in the CSS arena is an investment that pays huge dividends when done well. The more thoughtful and detailed the plan, the greater the probability for efficiency in execution. As such, all key CSS planners are present for the development of the task force plan.

The second tier leaders have been well trained and are capable of exercising their good judgement and great initiative when they understand the unit SOP, the plan and the commander's intent. The CSS executors understand the principles of effective time management.

Through the use of an effective SOP, prioritization of work, and a valid time line, they are able to effectively and efficiently conduct a multitude of tasks, at all echelons, simultaneously. The result is superb combat service support experienced consistently by the task force.

APPENDIX D
EFFECTIVE TIME MANAGEMENT IN COMPANY OPERATIONS

Using the troop leading procedures as a framework, the following matrix reflects a simplified example of the activities that might occur in the company CP, and what could be occurring within the platoons, company trains and attached elements. The goal is to conduct a multitude of tasks, at all echelons, simultaneously.

Table 10.--Time Management Matrix For Company Operations

<u>TLP</u>	<u>COMPANY CP ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>PLTs, TRAINS & ATTACHMENTS</u>
(1) Receive the Mission	-METT-T analysis -Map recon -Develop time line	
(2) Issue Warning Order	-Issue WARNORD #1 -Mission statement -General instructions -Special instructions -Task organization -Initial time line -Alert recon elements -XO moves to CP to conduct IPB with CDR	-Disseminate WARNORD #1 -Conduct mission analysis -Change task organization -Special equipment, munitions -Update unit status reports (personnel, weapons, vehicles classes of supply - per SOP) -Based on time schedule, refit, refuel, resupply, PCIs, rehearse, sleep plan
(3) Make a Tentative Plan (Include leader's recon/ R&S Plan)	-Course of action development -Wargame -Make a decision -Issue WARNORD #2	-Continue operations -Prepare to move -Disseminate WARNORD #2 -Continue operations -Recon leaders report to CP for specific instructions
(4) Initiate Movement	-METT-T -Per SOP	-As instructed
(5) Recon	-Dispatch recon patrols -Leader's recon	-SOP / METT-T -Confirm routes / axis -LP/OPs
(6) Complete the Plan	-Order preparation XO - IPB FIST - fire support 1SG - CSS Commo NCO - para 5 AD NCOIC - AD	-Continue operations -Each platoon sends 2 men to assist CP with orders prep, reproduction of matrices and graphics, construction of sand table (per SOP)
(7) Issue the Order	-Issue OPORD -Conduct briefback	-Continue operations
(8) Supervise and Refine the Plan	-Continuous supervision and refinement -Combined arms rehearsal -other rehearsals	-Platoon orders processes -Rehearsals -Continue preparation -Enforce sleep plan

Efficient Company Operations: A Scenario

The company commander receives a warning order from the TOC. The task force will conduct a movement to contact to reestablish contact with the enemy. The battalion expects to be required to conduct a hasty attack of a motorized rifle company in a hastily prepared defense. His company will lead the attack, and should expect to breach a complex obstacle of wire and mines. The attack will be preceded by a night tactical roadmarch.

The company commander conducts a METT-T analysis and develops a time line. He then issues warning order #1, via FM, to his subordinates. This entire process is accomplished in 15 minutes.

Per unit SOP, the 1SG scrutinizes the changes to the task organization. He ensures that the timing of changes to the task organization makes sense with the configuration of the LOGPAC which is being assembled in the field trains. If necessary, he coordinates for a better time to effect task organization or arranges for a reconfiguration of the LOGPAC.

This initial warning order directs any special team organization and gathering of special equipment and munitions. The subordinate leaders finalize personnel, maintenance, equipment and supply reports to update the commander's status. Based upon the time schedule, subordinate elements refit, refuel, resupply, rehearse,

conduct PCIs and enforce the sleep plan. Also, per SOP, if the situation permits, all subordinate leaders know to assemble at the CP for warning order #2 one hour after the initial warning order. They bring their updated unit status reports to this order.

One hour later, the commander issues warning order #2. Although all principle subordinates were not on the net for the first warning order, they are present at the company CP for the second one. The commander details the mission and known subordinate unit instructions, face to face, with his key leaders and answers their questions. The unit status reports are verified. The unit is now focused upon the upcoming mission.

The commander has all subordinate elements executing the directed priorities of work. The attached engineer element has linked up with the company's designated breach platoon for the upcoming mission and is conducting breaching drills of a complex obstacle they constructed in the company assembly area. After completing the breaching drills, the obstacle will be reconstructed for the company combined arms rehearsal to be conducted later.

Since the unit will not cross the line of departure (LD) until completion of the night tactical roadmarch, initial reconnaissance is limited to the roadmarch route from the assembly area to the start point. Reconnaissance

of this route is conducted by the company master gunner, who is placed in charge of this task.

The commander has finely tuned the orders preparation process for his company. In training, he developed his 2d tier leadership to plan and coordinate many aspects of his company's operations. In accordance with the unit SOP, many tasks associated with planning and preparing the operations order are delegated to these subordinates. The master gunner coordinates and briefs the tactical roadmarch. The XO, in concert with the commander, conducts the IPB and coordinates all applicable reconnaissance, and briefs the enemy situation. The fire support lieutenant prepares and briefs fire support. The stinger section sergeant prepares and briefs air defense. The XO and 1SG plan and the 1SG briefs combat service support. The communications NCO coordinates and briefs command and signal. After giving initial guidance to the order preparation team, the commander returns his focus to finalizing paragraph 3 and any other areas that he feels may need his attention.

Based upon instructions issued in Warning order #2, each platoon sends two men to the CP to assist with the orders preparation and reproduction process. Under the supervision of the commander's driver, the execution matrix and graphic overlays are reproduced for maneuver, fire support and CSS, and the sand table is constructed.

Well within one third of the time available for planning and preparing for this mission, the commander issues his operations order. All graphics and matrices are issued prior to the order, allowing subordinates sufficient time to post graphics and familiarize themselves with the plan.

The commander issues the operations order, having the key personnel brief their areas of expertise. The order is brief, clear and concise, followed by a briefback from each subordinate. The sand table used by the commander for his order is available for platoon orders and rehearsals, eliminating the need for each platoon to construct its own.

After the platoon orders, the company conducts a combined arms rehearsal, to include CSS. Supervision and refinement is a continuous process.

The commander recognizes the principles of effective time management and maximizes the time made available to his subordinate elements. He also recognizes that there is no such thing as a perfect plan. He accepts an 80% solution in the content of his order, knowing that the rehearsals and the supervision and refinement step of the troop leading procedures will allow him the opportunity to make necessary adjustments to the plan. Through the use of an effective SOP, prioritization of work, a valid time line and well trained subordinates, he is able to conduct a multitude of tasks, at all echelons, simultaneously.

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